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Chapter I
INTROD UCTION
John Fitz Gerald and Daniel McCoy
In the past public interest in energy policy has fluctuated with movements in
energy prices; when prices were exceptionally high intemst peaked. Since 1986,
when energy prices fell precipitately, energy policy has attracted much less public
attention or scrutiny both internationally and in Ireland. However, the cost of
energy to the economy still remains substantial to both the househokl and the
productive sector. As an important input to industry, movements in domestic
energy prices can significantly affect Irish competitiveness. The Report of the
Industrial Policy Review Group (1992), among others, has highlighted this issue.
In addition, technical change, the growing attention to the environmental
consequences of burning fossil fuels, and developments in the EC are posing new
challenges for policy requiring a re-examination of our traditional outlook.
This Policy Research Paper examines the changing context for energy policy
in Imland, in particular the implications of developments at an EC~ level for how
we organise the production and distribution of euergy. It publishes in revised
form the papers presented at a conference organised by the Energy Policy
Research Centre in the Economic and Social Research Institute in Mamh 1993.
EC Policy
At a European level there has been an increase in the pace of development of
energy policy over the last five years arising from a number of different factors:
the changes made in Ihe Single European Act which increased the EC’s
responsibilities; increased attention to the promotion of competition to reduce
costs; a growing concern lor tbe environmenlul impact of the processing and
consumption of energy and, finully, tbe Maastricht Treaty.
Throttghoul this ix~licy p:lpcr wc refer to thc P2ttropcatl Community or Eurolx:;m Union zts the EC.
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These developments in the EC have focused attention on the issues of
competition policy, environmental policy and long-term security of supply
(Surrey, 1992). However, progress has been slow and in Chapter 2 Helm argues
that one of the most importaut tasks for EC policy makers, the development of
the European energy transmission network, has attracted little attention.
The European Commission on the strength of the Single European Act,
published its proposals for a single energy market (SEM) in 1988 (European
Commission, 1988b). These proposals were intended to create a unified internal
energy market without barriers to trade and competition, not by seeking to
introduce co-ordinated energy policies, but rather by extending competition
policy to the previously excluded area of energy.
The most significant proposal to date by the European Commission relating
to the energy market is the recommendation on common rules for internal
markets in electricity and natural gas (European Commission, 1992).
Negotiations on these proposals have been hampered by the divergent nature of
the energy infrastructures across menlber states which have led, in turn, to
pronounced differences in domestic energy policies.
There has been some progress on the adoption of directives on competition
and public procurement in the energy sector. Transit directives, to facilitate the
exchange of power and gas between utilities, were adopted in both the electricity
and natural gas sectors in 1990 and 1991 respectively. The EC has also adopted a
directive on price transparency in the gas and electricity utilities in 1990, which
requires notification of the rates charged to all categories of customers.
A more contentious proposal in the "market-oriented" approach is the issue
of third party access (TPA) to the European gas and electricity networks. TPA
would oblige companies operating transmission and distribution networks for gas
and electricity to offer terms for use of the grid to individual consumers or other
distribution companies if there is capacity available (European Parliament, 1992).
Four general principles lie behind the EC Commission’s approach to
developing Community energy policy.:
¯ the need for a gradual approach,
¯ the principle ofsubsidiarity,
¯ the need to avoid excessive regulation,
¯ dialogue and consultation.
The first principle recognises the need to allow the economy generally, and
industry in particular, time to adjust in a flexible and orderly manner to major
policy changes. Owing to their capital intensity, energy infrastructure and other
energy intensive industries require long lead times for planning and construction.
As a result, uncertainty, which may call into question the likely rate of return on
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future investment, must be minimised by clearly setting out the levels of
liberalisation to be achieved al each stage.
The subsidiarity principle, in theory, enables member states to opt for the
system of liberalisation which best suits their natural resources, their industry
infrastructure, and their overall energy policies. New regulations will be
necessary to complete the inlernal market but these should replace rather than
supplement existing instruments. An additional proposal is the introduction of the
concept of unbundling; thai is the separation of the production, transmission, and
distribution operations of utilities.
Measures are envisaged to ensure that fair competition prevails as national
energy markets are opened up. These include proposals on:
* Tile Control of State Aid - to ensure that distortions to competitive energy
markets caused by state subsidies are controlled across member slates. To
allow for national security concerns, continued aid of a reserved sector
would be authorised. The percentage share of total electricity represented
by this reserved sector would decline over time;
Electricity and Gas Transmission Infrastructure - given that the internal
market is likely to create increased European cross-border demand for gas
and electricity. Supply will be unable to respond unless transmission
infrastructures and interconnections are developed at a sufficient pace.
The proposals related to tile electricity sector include recommendations on
the opening up of generation to competition and the role of member states on
security of supply. The latter involves pernritting national authorities to order
priority utilisation of indigenous sources of electricity generation for up to 20 per
cent of needs (15 per cent after 2000); permission to order priority use of energy
sources thai are renewable or are based on waste or cogeneration (not exceeding
25 MW each) in return for u reasonable price. The proposals for the gas sector
parallel those for electricity.
In addition to EC directives and proposals on tile energy sector, there urea
number of important environmental proposals that have significant implications
for energy use. These include the 1988 EC Large Combustion Plant directive on
sulphur emissions for electricity production (European Commission, 1988a) and
proposals to limi! the Community’s carbon dioxide emissions in the year 2000 to
their 1990 emission levels (European Commission, 1991a). This latter proposal
includes a provision for a combined energy - carbon tax.
Tile EC also highlights the role of energy efficiency measures to help achieve
targets. This focus on efficiency is part of the Community’s "no regrets" strategy
for dealing with the potential problem of climate change. Specific programmes
are in place to improve energy technology diffusion and energy efficiency
measures and to harness alternative power sources. The EC is also helping to
fund the expansion of the energy transmission network in Europe through
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programmes like REGEN. Part of tile cost of financing Ihe gas pipeline belween
h’eland and Great Britain is being met under this programnle.
The European Commission (1991b) set out the European Energy Charter in
order to address the strategic issue of long-term supply security. The Charter,
made in conjunction with the countries of Eastern Europe and the former USSR.
is an attempt to secure an expanding supply of reasonably priced oil and gas for
tile EC in return for investment, technology and hard currency for Eastern
Europe.
Taken together the EC agenda on energy policy poses major challenges for
the energy sector in Ireland. It will be a factor for change in the sector and it can
be expected to form the agenda for domestic policy [’or the rest of the decade.
Tit& Polic3’ Paper
This Policy Paper considers u number of aspects of Irish energy policy in the
light of developments within the EC.
In Chapter 2 Helm discusses the rationale for EC and domestic energy policy,
the role of competition and the importance of developing Trans-European
networks. Market failures pervade Ihe energy seclor and. as a resull, while
government intervention may frequently be unsatisl~lctory, intervention remains
essential. The Chapter stresses the need to develop a European transmission
network. Because the development of such a network may not be in the inleresls
of the current phlyers in the energy nlarkel there is a need for the EC, using its
new powers under the Maastricht Treaty, to intervene. II suggests lll:.ll this issue.
the development of networks, nlay be more important than tile question of Third
Party Access to existing networks.
Chapter 3 by Fitz Gerald and McCoy, is concerned with the full range of
developments al the EC level its Ihey affect the h’ish economy. This Chapter
concludes that the draft EC directives are pushing Irehmd in the direction it
would probably wish to travel. There is both the F, ossibility and the need to
inlroduce competition into the energy and gas systems. However, this will be
difficult given the small size of the energy system of the Republic. In the case of
electricity, compctilion can best be introduced by allowing new operators to build
and operate generating stations. The size of these generators should not be such
as to dominate the system, lri the case of gas. the transmission system should be
open to use by third parties. In Ihe long rtm the energy transmission systems ori
the island should be fully integrated to permit proper competition. It would not
be desirable to privatise the elements of the energy system which are essentially
natural monopolies.
Users of energy should be charged the [’till price of’energy. Given the existing
tax distortions, competitiveness is better enhanced through measures directed at
the labour market than through subsidising energy. The taxes ~.lnd subsidies on
energy should be reformed to reflect the environmental cost of different fuels.
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The importance of improving energy efficiency is emphasised by the EC.
Chapter 4 by Scott describes tlae results of a study of energy efficiency in the
household sector. It uses the results fi’om a survey of households to examine the
extent to which tile opportunities for energy saving are exploited. It finds that the
behaviour of households in Ihe pasl has been irrational - failing to exploit
profitable opportunities for saving energy indicating some market failure.
Scott suggests that, in the light of these results, a policy of using taxation
alone to promote energy efficiency and minimise environmental damage will not
be sufficient. There are a number of reasons for this apparent "markel failure": a
lack of information; problems arising from housing tenure, in particular in rented
accommodation, which mean thai the gains from investment in energy saving do
not accrue to the investors: problems in financing the necessary investn~enI.
The result of increased competition and environmental regulation will be
serious pressure on the peal industry. Chapter 5 by Nic Giolla Choille examines
the possible impact of a carbon tax on the peal industry. It identifies the current
cost of using peat Io generate eleclricity over other alternative sources al aroul’~d
£30 million. Earlier studies suggested a higher figure because Ihey failed to lake
account of the fact that much of the expense is a sunk cost; it would not disappear
even if the peal industry closed.
The introduction of a carbon lax would substantially increase the cost to the
Electricity Supply Board (ESB) of using peat, providing a stronger incentive Io
switch to alternative fuels. This reflects the fact that emissions from burning peal
contain nlore carbon dioxide (a greenhouse gas) per unil of electricity generated
than Ior other fuels used by the ESB. However, the burden to the nation of
subsidising peat electricity through electricity prices would not be changed by the
lax.
Chapler 6 by Connifl~ examines the relalionship between energy demand and
the growlh in GDP and prices. Energy elasticities are necessary inputs to the
types of analyses appearing in other papers in this publication. However, the
estimates of elasticities are actually far from soundly established and there are
even disagreements in Ihe literature on how elasticities ought to be estimated.
Taken at face value, estimates of the GDP elasticity made in the conventional
way for Irish data seem to indicate large decreases over time. Chapter 6
investigates the possibility that the apparent changes in eslimales may be largely
illusory, the consequences of hidden price effects and inadequately clarified
technological advances, as well as deficiencies in the methods of measuring
aggregate energy quantity and price.
The overall conclusion drawn from the analysis described is that it would be
unwise to lake the CUITent GDP elasticity as much below unity. Ftnure energy
demand is likely to grow in line with economic growth, unless there are further
extreme price hikes of the order of the 1973-74 and 1979-80 oil crises.
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Chapter 2
ENERGY POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN CONTEXT
Dieter Helm, New College, Oxlbrd
I. Introduction
Energy policy has traditionally been a national activity. Governments have
been concerned to ensure that national supplies of energy are secure and
sufficiently diverse to prevent disruption from price or supply shocks.
Self-sufficiency has been an aim in many countries: France’s nuclear programme,
Britain’s plan for coal in the 1970s, and Ireland’s development of peat and gas are
examples.
This national preoccupation is gradually breaking down for two reasons.
First, teebnical change has increased the prospects Ior international transmission
of gas and electricity, so that the network natural monopolies are being redefined
at the European rather than national level. Second, the process of European
political and economic integration in general, and the internal market in
particular, is increasingly providing a European focus [’or the consideration of
questions of energy policy. The security of European supplies is gradually
becoming a more important question than the security of national supplies.
These developmenls are evolutionary, and will depend for their effect on
matters of national geography and national political will. Nevertheless, the trend
is probably irreversible. This Chapter considers some of the dimensions of energy
policy in tiffs European context, and focuses in particular on two questions: tbe
promotion of competition at’,d tile development of trans-European networks.
The Chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 sets out the underlying
rationale for energy policy, the market failures. Section 3 considers the role of
compelition :.rod the implications for market slruclure. Section 4 considers the
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interconnections issues and the conditions required for the development of
trans-Europe,’m networks. Finally, Section 5 presents a number of conclusions.
2. The Rationale for Energy Policy
The rationale for energy policy is based upon two premises: that energy
markets "fail" in providing an appropriate allocation of scarce resources, and that
government intervention can improve upon these failures. Traditionally, those in
favour of activist energy policies concentrate on the former; those against focus
on the latter. A balanced pragmatic approach takes both into account.
Market failures
The energy sector is eharacterised by multiple market failures. These can be
divided into static and dynamic efficiency issues. On the static front, there are
three substantial failures: natural monopoly, co-ordination and pollution. Left to
its own devices, a private market will be dominated by monopoly or oligopoly,
and vertical integration. Pollution will be excessive, and there is no guarantee
that dispatch will be at least cost. For these reasons, final consumer prices are
regulated in virtually every developed country, environmental policy puts
constraints on emissions, and, even in the English and Welsh system, electricity
despatch is regulated through a compulsory pool.~
Energy policy has also been significantly concerned with dynamic efficiency.
It has been a conventional wisdom that private markets will be unlikely to invest
in the "right" amount of investment, or in a sufficient degree of diversity. The
explanation for these market failures is complex. It relies on an analysis of
competition between oligopolists and the externality associated with the
avoidance of supply interruption. Purchases of electricity and gas are rarely
physical contracts: the supply and demand are typically system-wide in nature
and therefore introduce an element of public good. Consumers find it hard to
signal the insurance value of securily and supply, and generators face downside
risk from the prospect of over-supply. There are rarely import opportunities
rapidly available to meet demand surges.
In theory, entry into the market will come wherever future potential demand
exceeds supply. In the England and Wales electricity system, this is supposed to
work through the loss of load probability (LOLP), which provides information
against which entrants can foma rational expectations. In practice, there are two
difficulties. These are the presence of entry barriers, and the problems associated
with the characteristics of power station investments. The electricity industry in
particular is far from meeling the conditions of a contestable market. Hit-and-run
entry is impossible, and sunk costs are high.
The pool is a spot market in cleclricily. Each generator bids in prices (not costs) [’or hallZhour periods one
day ahead, a, dispalch order is derived, and generdlars arc paid on the basi~ of the Sysleln marginal costs. See
Helm ( 1991 )for a more exlensive Irealment.
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From the perspective of the generator, investments are made on the basis of
ussumplions about the future supply and demand balance over the life of the
investment. The possibility thai supply ntay exceed demand in the future creates
risk. Therefore. generators seek protection against this possibility, through
vertical contracts or vertical integration. In order to encourage generators to
invest, consumers need to commit to absorb the costs. In most electricity
markets, this is achieved through vertical integration and franchises. This is a
normal markel structure in electricity, deviating markedly from the competitive
13aradigm.
Governnlenl failures
Although there is some disagreement about the concentration of investrtlenl
on similar types of power stations and some controversy about the co-ordination
of capacity, most parties to the energy debate agree thai market failures are
pervasive. However, Ihe main controversy in recent years has focused on
government failures. The history of energy policy is littered with examples of
policy "failures". In England and Wales, the nuclear programme in general, and
the Advanced Gas Cooled Reactors (AGR) programme in particular, have been
extensively criticised. Operating costs and the scale of power station investments
in the public sector were excessive.
The various government failures can be divided into two groups: those
associated with government ownership and those associated with energy policy.
Nationalisalion has created parlicular problems. The inability over three decades
to develop control i11echalliSn1s, the pervasive iutl’tlsioi1 of nlacroeconolllic
expenditure controls on investment projects, and the biasing of investn3ents
towards domestic technology have contributed to the significant additional costs.
The faihtres of energy policy are harder to evaluate. Government
interventions over the choice of fuel. and in particular the protection of domestic
coal industries ill Britain .and West Germany, have rested on nluch wider political
objectives. The dislocation cannot be judged purely on grounds of industry
efficiency costs. Japun and France’s drive for nuclear power have been governed
by nalional security considerations, in France’s case explicitly so. Nevertheless.
the exposure of investment decisions to the vagaries of electoral geography has
resulted in higher costs, and it is to be questioned whether these have always
been justified.
A Pragmatic approach
Market and gover11111en[ f:ailures vLn’y froln case to C:.lSe. There is 11o a priori
correct answer to the appropriate balance. Failures vary too across lime. In
periods of excess supply and low international energy prices, the extent of private
investment failures is obviously much less. During the 1980s in Britain, the main
issue was Ihe static one of costs, and competition provided an appropriate
response. The investment issue simply did not arise. In Ihe late t990s, the focus
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will probably shift to investment, and hence policy will shift to dynamic
efficiency questions.
More generally, within countries, grids and transmission systems are largely
mature across the European Community. However, between countries, the
connections are immaturc. Thus, whilsl national governments focus on the
utilisation of existing systems, European policy is more concerned with the
investment questions.
3. Competition and the Structure of ElectriciO, and Gas Industries
Competition policy towards the energy sector has been gradually applied in a
number of European countries. The application in the UK has gone further and
faster than other countries. It therefore provides an example which has greatly
influenced the development of the Internal Energy Market programme.
The main reason for introducing greater competition into electricity markets
is as a method of regulating the markets. Rather than attempting to place controls
on dominant firms, the presence of competitors, actual or potential, limits the
ability to raise prices above costs and to select inappropriate investments.
The introduction of competition is, however, a complex process. It requires
two parallel developments: the separation of natural monopoly from artificial
monopoly, and the opening up of artificial monopoly to competition. This
strategy has been partially adopted in the England aud Wales electricity and gas
markets. In electricity, supply has been separated from transmission and
distribution in a regulatory sense (though only partially through structural
change), and the artificial generating monopoly has been divided into three
companies. The remaining natural monopolies are isolated into twelve regional
companies and one national one. and regulation is applied to each separately.
The changes introduced at privalisation were designed to bring about a
gradual transition to a fully competitive market over an eight year period to 1998.
During this period, new entry was to be encouraged into generation, and supply
was to be gradually deregulated by dropping the franchise limit in 1994 and
abolishing it in 1998.
These structural changes - "unbuudling" in European jargon - addressed
questions of ownership. They have, however, only partially addressed the
questions of control. Since privatisation, there has been a substantial
"dash-for-gas". However, contrary to the British government’s claims, the new
entrants in fact represent only minimum extra competition: all significant projects
are supported by back-to-back contracts with the regional electricity companies
(RECs)" and in some cases these are further underwritten by equity stakes. In
The RECs are the successors If the Area Boards which existed in the nationalised induslries. They are
responsible for distribution of electricity within their franchise areas, and supply to franchised customers
within their area below I MW ( to fall to 100 KW in 1994).
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effect, there has been a process of vertical integration through contracts.
Investment by new generators, it transpires, will only take place if long-term
commitments are entered into on the basis of the RECs’ franchise markets,
naturally or legally defined.
Even these REC-based entrants have required regulatory protection. Terms of
access to the system have been fixed, and the regulation of transmission tariffs
will affect their ability to compete for a dispatch slot. Accounting separation, and
the assignment of costs between supply and distribution, has also been a
significant regulatory issue.
The implication for European policy of the England and Wales experiment
are several. Unbundling, pet" se, will not create competition. It will not arise
spontaneously. Rather, regulation for competition will be required. It is the
almost complete absence of appropriate regulator), arrangements in the European
Commission’s proposals for the haternal Energy Market which will undemline its
effect. Furthennore, even if unbundling were to facilitate the promotion of
competition, if accompanied by appropriate regulation, the resulting market
would tend to re-integrate through contractual arrangements in order to
underwrite the sunk cosls of new power station investments. In other words,
entrants will want some protection from competition in order to avoid a
competitive threat. This paradox has so far eluded the regulators in England and
Wales, and resulted in the apparent confusion that competition is measured by the
number of "competitors". There is a considerable difference between competition
in the static sense (and therefore through a pool) and dynamic con]petition where
generators compete for longer-term contracts.
4. htterconnection and European Regulation
The shift in the definition of the national networks to the European level is al
present being conducted through a series of bilateral links between national
utilities. The links reflect the interests of dominant incumbents. Thus Electricit6
de France has constructed links with most of its neighbours to export its nuclear
surplus. The UK has to date refrained from linking its North Sea gas network
with the European network in pursuit of national gas self-sufficiency, though this
is now under active consideration.
There are several related problems with this ad hoc approach. The first is the
classic "co-operation versus self-interest" trade off. Europe as a whole would be
much better off if a Europe-wide approach were adopted. Capacity margins could
fall as countries backed up each others’ systems. Diversity could be provided
between countries, rather than each individually opting for mixed fuel sources.
Economies of scale could be exploited through access to larger market areas.
However, from each individual country’s perspective (and often each utility’s
too), it is better if others co-operate ~nd it pursues its own self-interest. Britain
may want to enjoy tile benefits of security of supply provided by excess
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investment in others’ systems, but refrain IYom providing a reciprocal service
itself. The French electricity link, and the tardiness in developing a European
North Sea gas network, tire examples.
A further probleln with the national approach is that tile system develops ill a
piecemeal way. Each connection is considered in isolation, without attention
being directed to the costs and benefits to the system as a whole. In this respect,
the network is a public good: private markets typically under-provide public
goods.
The European Commission’s approach has to date given little attention to
these network issues. Its focus has been on narrower issues of competition,
gradually opening up existing networks to greater access. Its programme of
directives have taken an evolutionary approach, starting with transparency in
prices, inoving on to third party access, and eventually to unbundling.
It has not yet had much success. The price level differcntials between
member countries remain large. These price dispersions are even gre:aler for
parlicular classes of custorner. The consetluences for the internal market in
relaled energy inlensive industries is considerable, as Figure 2.1 shows. For some
industries, competition is essentially determined by eleclricily and gas prices - for
example, in alunliniunl, steel and chemicals.
Figure 2. I
0.08
Industrial Electricity Prices, Excluding Taxation
ECU a kWh
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Source: hllematlonal I~l~ergy Agency Stalistics (price.’; convened at ¢urrenl ECU eXcll:mge r, Ltc.,;). EC
Index con~nlcled by OXERA
The main reason for the continuation of these price differences is the lack of
interconncctions and rights of access. Without inlerconneclion, transfers cannol
take place. Bul even with interconneclions, prices can only then be harmonised if
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competitive entry is permitted and supported by competition law. The Internal
Energy Market programme addresses Ihe former, but not the latter.
There is. however, a significant change ill approach signalled by the
Maastricht Treaty. Article 129b of Title 7 provides for the developmenl of
Trans-European ~’~etworks.3 The exael ternls ;ire:
Article 129b
I. To helI) achieve the objectives referred to in Articles 7a and 130a and to
enable citizens af the Union. economic operators and regional and local
communities to derive full benefit from the setting up of an area withot~t
imernal frontiers, the Community shall contribute to the establishment
attd development of trans-Em’opean networks in the areas of [ratlspol’l,
lelecommllnicalions attd energy ittfrasll’ttclttres.
2. Within the framework of a system of open and competitive markets.
action by the Community shall aim at promoting the interconnection and
iltteroperabiliO, of tlational networks as well as access to such nenvorks.
h shall take accotmt in particular of the need to link island, landlocked
and peril)heral regions with the central regions af the CommuniO,.
The full implementation of Title 7 will require major new initiatives, and
indeed the Commission has already begun to support particular projects like Ihe
gas interconnector belween IrelarJd and Britain. The problem at present is thai the
Commission is approaching the network invesmaent problem on a case-by-case
basis. It has not addressed the overall system requirements. This is in stark
contrast to the Japanese approach, and indeed Io the approaches adopted in
individual member countries.
It has been argued that these questions can be adclressed by the application of
the principle of subsidiarily: thai regulation can be delegated to the national level.
and that in consequence there will be regulatory competition. Those countries
which apply the best regulatory approaches will, it is argued, gain a competitive
edge over those which take a more restrictive policy.
This argumerd has beguiling political atlraclions. 11 does not however
convince since, as indicated in Section 2 above, the provision of networks is a
public good: all member countries could benefit through a European-wide
approach.’*
5. Conclusions
Market failures pervade the energy sector. Ahhough there have been
numerous examples of government failure, the case for an appropriately designed
energy policy is persuasive. "]’hat policy should be defined at the level of natural
3 Article 129c provides the slops required to meet article 129b.
" The nature of regul;itory compelifion is :dso open Io ils own failures. Ttaese are described in Hehn (1993).
14 ISSUES IN IRISH ENERGY POLICY
monopoly appropriate to the energy sector: in electricity and gas, this is
increasingly at the international level. This rise in scale is partly a function of
technology, partly of market demand, and partly of primary fuel locations.
The provision of network infrastructures has considerable public good
characteristics. They will, typically, be under-provided by the private sector.
They will also be under-provided if national governments pursue national energy
policies. The development of the European electricity and gas grids is
appropriately designed at the European rather than national level: it provides a
clear example where the principle of subsidiarity is not appropriate.
Infrastructure networks are essential to European conlpetitiveness: the ability
of European firms to compete with US and Far Eastern rivals depends upon
access to competitively priced energy. Failure to develop energy networks results
in higher costs associated with national security capacity margins and national
diversity prograrnmes.
These concerns are recognised in the Maastricht Treaty. Title 7 explicitly
refers to the need to develop policy in this area. However, the Treaty recognition
does not appear to have yet been grasped by the European Commission. The
Internal Energy Market, in focusing on third party access (TPA) and unbundling
has only tangential relevance: indeed it is possible to argue that these largely
static concerns may actually reduce investment incentives in new infrastructure.
The Internal Energy Market has fidtered: the opposition of European utilities
to TPA has resulted in a stalemate. In order to take matters forward, the European
Commission could renew its efforts to see through the directives once the
political climate becomes more favourable. A superior approach would be to take
the current stalemate as an opportunity to go back to lhe drawing board: to
consider what should constitute a European energy policy appropriate to the
competitiveness of the European economy in the next century. The Maastricht
Treaty, in Title 7, provides a good basis. If TPA and the rest of the Internal
Energy Market were set in this context, then the Commission u’tight have a
greater chance of success.
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Chapter 3
ISSUES IN IRISH ENERGY POLICY
John Fitz Gerald and Daniel McCoy
I. Introduction
In a modern market economy there are many sectors which develop and grow
without major state involvement and without specific targeting by public policy.
However, in ahnost all countries the energy sector attracts special attention from
public policy. This is true, not just at a national level, but it is also true al the
level of the EC. This Chapter considers the implications for Ireland o1’ a series of
proposals, put forward by the EC Commission, which potentially affect the
energy sector.
The need for a public policy on energy is justified on the grounds of the
existence of market fuilures in the sector. In particular, increasing returns to scale
in tile energy sector have resulted in the development of monopolies in most EC
economies. The potential for increasing returns arises from the technical
characteristics of the electricity and gas industries and, at an early stage in the
development of the energy sector, it resulted in intervention by the state. In
many cases Ihis took the form of the creation of a state owned firm to exploit the
benefits arising from increasing scale. However, government intervention, both
nationally and internationally has in the past failed to meet its objectives, often as
u result of political expediency see, for example, Helm ( 1991 ).
In Ireland the governnlenl plays an active and prominent role in the energy
murket by state-ownership of the main utility monopolies, influencing decisions
on fuel choice and making strategic decisions on issues of security of supply.
These issues are examined in this paper.
The need for an energy policy is justified by the scale of operation in the
energy sector and, related to this. the presence of monopolies or oligopolies at
different stages in the production process. The presence of significant negative
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environmental externalities in the energy sector, in any event, calls for state
involvement in policy making. The scale of operation and the presence of
environmental externalities makes the energy sector very different from many
other sectors such as, for example, the manufacture of clothing. In the latter case
the normal working of the market is likely to resull in an efficient scale of
operation without direct government intervention.
As discussed in the first two Chapters, there is an increasing role for the EC
to intervene to ensure an efficient operation of the energy market. The impetus
for this involvement arises from a number of factors: the global nature of
problems of pollution; the completion of the interred EC market; the experience
of the successive oil crises of the last 20 years; the desire to reap the benefits
from increased scale of operation through inlerconnection of national syslems.
Many of these concerns are already rellected in domestic energy policy.
Traditionally, the overall objective of Irish energy policy has been to
minimise the cost of energy to the economy. However, there are a number of
constraints which nlusl be taken into ztccounl:~
¯ The need to ensure security and continuity of supply,
¯ The need to minimise or reduce environmental damage,
¯ Certain social considerations - e.g., employment in Bord Na M6na, the
state owned peat industry.
h’J the past energy policy has been more concerned with security and
continuity of supply. However, attention is now turning to the issues of
controlling the negative effects of monopolistic behaviour and to the
environmental side effects of energy use. A rellection of this shift in emphasis is
the decision 1o restructure the ESB into separate business units covering power
generation, national grid, customer service, commercial enterprises, and business
services.
This Chapter considers the wider implications of developments in the EC for
energy policy in Ireland. It does not aim to make a comprehensive statement on
energy policy; for example, many of the issues for policy concerning the
domestic oil market are not considered here (see DKM. 1991). In Seclion 2 we
give a brief description of the important characteristics of the Irish energy sector.
In Energy Irek~nd. published by the Govemmem in 1978. the nmin elements of energy policy were specified:
a. Optimum developmenl of indigenous resources.
b. Access IO Ihc chc:ll~Sl markets for imported energy supplies.
c. Seeurily of supply by diversilication of sources.
d. Promotion of economy in the use of fuels.
e. Slock-piling againsl emergencies.
f. Protection of Ihe environment.
g. Encouraging expli~rz, ltlon t~r hydroc:lrb~ms and ur:mium.
h. Parlicipalion in research Io discover and develop new energy sources.
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In Section 3 we examine the likely energy requircmenls of the economy for the
rest of the 1990s. Section 4 discusses the inlportance of security of supply and
Section 5 considers the interaction of energy policy and the environment. The
issues of competition and ownership aud pricing and taxation are dealt with in
Sections 6 and 7. Finally, conclusions are presented in Section 8.
2. The Irish Energy Sector
Special features
Irish energy policy is affected by the country’s endowment (or lack of
endowment) of naturul resources, the history and relatively st’nail scale of the
economy. The absence of coal or oil nleanl that. since the nineteenth century,
energy was primarily derived fronl imports and, as ;.i result, was generally more
expensive than in certain other parts of Northern Europe. This affected the pattern
of economic development. Ireland has no tradition of industries requiring major
energy input such as sleel, srnehing and process chemic:.ds. Any industry which
required cheap energy tended to gravitate to regions of Europe with an abundance
of energy: in tile nineteenth century the coal deposits of Britain and Germany
provided the basis for expansion of energy intensive industries. More recently,
Scandirtavia, with cheap hydro-electricity, has attracted such ventures.
The absence of m:ljor domestic energy sources posed speci:.d problems tot the
Irish economy during the Second World War. The experience of energy shortages
during the war and the relalive inability of the government to take remedi.:d
action had a lasting effect on domestic energy policy. In the years after the war
ended slrenuous eftbrts were made to reduce this dependence on imports by
developing domestic energy sources, in particular the use of peat to generate
electricity. The importance attached to security of supply in h’ish energy policy
was reinforced by the temporary shortages of oil during the Suez crisis in 1956
and during the first and second OPEC oil crises of the 1970s. The result of these
experiences is that considerable attention is devoted IO security of supply in
developirtg energy policy. In really cases this requirement lakes primacy over
measures to miuimise the cost of supply of energy. Examples of this emphasis on
security are the policy of maintaining a domestic refinery, the policy of
diversifying fuel supplies, and the construction of a gas interconnector to the UK
before it is needed to rephce the indigenous gas resources in the Marathon field.
The Irish economy over the last 35 years has progressively opened up to the
outside world. The freeing of trade, the extensive inflow of foreign capital and
the free movement of labour since the last ceulury have ;.ill conlribuled tO the
character of recent ecouomic developl’nent. However. tile isolated nature of the
Irish electricity lind gas syslerus ret’u~.fins an iu’Jporlant feature of tile system.
While the installation of a gas intereonuector to Britain will modify this situation,
the need to mainl:ain security of supply rue:.u~s that the scope for using this one
iulerconnector may be limited.
!
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A further feature of the isolation of the domestic energy system, both gas and
electricity, is the absence of effective imerconnectors between the Republic and
Northern Ireland. Terrorist action in the mid-1970s closed the existing electricity
interconneclor and it has not been reopened since. This issue is dealt with later in
this Chapter.
Finally, the density of population in lrehmd is quite low by the standards of
Northern Europe. Industrial policy has also promoted a dispersal of industrial
activity throughout the country, away from the major traditional industrial centres
of Cork and Dublin. The result of both these factors has been a significant
overhead pushing up the costs of distribution for electricity, gas, and oil.
Existing structure
The inlperative to establish a secure supply of energy and the need to
promote domestic econonlic activity resulted in the development of a series of
peat-fired electricity generating stations in the years after the Second World War.
However. the electricity generated fronl peat proved to be more expensive than
that from imported oil or coal. As discussed in Chapter 5, the harvesting and
processing of the peat is quite labour intensive compared to the process of
generating electricity from oil or gas. As the world real price of oil fell in the
1950s and the 1960s the cost penalty of using domestic peat increased. The rapid
rise in oil prices after 1973, which also affected the price of coal, temporarily
reduced the cost penalty for peat generation and there wzts some increase in peat
generating capacity. The fall in oil prices after 1986 has reversed this situation.
Beginning in the 1970s and continuing into the 1980s there was considerable
hydrocarbon exploration activity in Irish waters. A significant gas find was made
in the early 1970s by Marathon off the South coast and this canle on stream at the
end of that decade. Production reached a peak in 1983, accounting for almost 20
per cent of domestic primary energy requirenlents. While traces of hydrocarbons
were discovered at other locations these proved too expensive to exploit, even
when real oil prices were higher in the mid-1980s.
The Marathon gas field and the smaller Ballycotton field are likely to be
exhausted around the end of the century, substantially increasing Ireland’s
dependence on imported energy. By the Autumn of 1996 supplies may not be
sufficient to meet peak demand from the ESB. With a developed gas distribution
system in place, this will mean that there will be a need to import significant
quantities of gas towards the end of the century. The fact that construction of the
pipeline is nearing completion, though the requirement for imports will not occur
for a number of years, arises from the need to ensure security of supply.2
As a result of the indigenous gas finds and a lagged response to changes in
relative prices there was a major change in the sources of energy used in Ireland
A significam part of lbe funding is zdso coming from the EC REGEN progralnme. This funding might not be
~vailable [’or an alternative scheme.
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over the 1980s. This is shown in Figure 3.1. The availability of natural gas led to
a switch in consumption. It was used, first for electricity generation and later by
other sectors of the economy. There was also a major switch to solid fuel by the
electricity generation sector. This change occurred as a result of the oil price
shocks of the 1970s which highlighted the dependence of the economy on oil.
The need to diversify energy supplies and the change in relative prices resulted in
the decision to develop the coal-fired electricity generation station at Moneypoint
at the end of the 1970s. The net result was that oil, which had accounted for
almost 70 per cent of primary energy requirements in 1980, was reduced to
meeting under 50 per cent of requirements by 199 I.
Figure 3. I
Source of Primary Energy
Oil 68% ~
~48%
Hydro 3%
~ Hydro 1%
1980 1991
Source: Department of Energy, Energy Balance Sheets.
By 1991 gas accounted for around 15 per cent of primary energy
requirements. In addition, a quarter of total gas production was used as a
feedstock for the domestic chemical and fertiliser industry. When taken together
with peat and a small amount of domestic hydro-electricity, around 30 per cent of
domestic consumption of energy was met from domestically produced primary
energy in 1991.3
The distribution of final consumption of energy is shown in Figure 3.2.
These figures differ from those in Figure 3.1 in that they show the consumption
of the energy in its final "transformed" state, after it has been turned into
electricity, petrol, etc.. Some of the primary energy is used itself in the
transformalion process. Almost 22 per cent of final energy consumption is met
This figure excludes natural gas used as a feed*stock.
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fi’om solid fuel - coal and peat. Over half of the coal and the vast bulk of the peat
is used for heating by tile residential sector. Irehmd is unusual in the extent to
which solid fuels are used for healing. Just over half the oil is used in the
transport sector with most of the rest being used in the commercial and the
industrial sectors.
Source." Department of Energy. Energy B;dance Sheets.
Figure 3.2 Figure 3.3
I.~iHtsl Colzsumptioo of Etler~, Fuel for Elcctrici0,
Oil 55%
Coal3g% t7%
- Peat 18%
Gas 9%
Ga| 24% °Coal 12~
1991 1991
As can be seen from Table 3.1, the sources of primary energy in Ireland are
broadly similar to those in the rest of the EC with one exception. Whereas Ireland
depends on peat for just under 15 per cent of i ls primary energy, in tile rest of the
EC nuclear energy plays the same role. This diflk:rence has special significance
when considering tile environmental impact of h’ish energy consumption (See
Fitz Gerald and McCoy, 1992).
Table 3. I : Primasy Energy Constmtption b~’ Fuel ( per cent)
Coal Peat Oil Gas Ntrclear Other
Ireland    22.4 13.2 48.3 15.4 0.0    0.7
EC 21.0 0.0 44.8 18.3 14.3 1.6
The data for Ireland are for 1991 ; the data lbr the EC are for 1989.
Electricity accounts for around 15 per cent of final energy consunlpHon.
Within total electricity consumption tile residential sector and Ihe industrial
sector each accounted for around 39 per cent of the total. Over the 1980s the
share of consumption of electricity by the residential sector tended to decline as
consumption of natural gas by that sector picked up. However, both the share and
the absolute consumption of electricity by the industrial sector increased over the
period.
Electricity plays a vital role in the energy sector and tile current sources of
primary energy used by that sector are shown in Figure 3.3. Coal ,accounted lbr
almost two-fifths of tile fuel used4; oil accounted for under one-fifth. This is a
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radically different situation to tile 1970s when the bulk of Electricity generation
was dependent on oil.
The final consumption of energy by sector is shown in Figure 3.4. Industry,
transport and the residential sectors each account for around 30 per cent of total
energy consumption. The commercial sector accounts lot the rest - just over 10
per Eent. As can be seen from Table 3.2, this pattern of consunlption is not very
different from that of a mtmber of other Northern European countries such as
Belgium, France, Germany and the UK. A notable exception is Spain where the
residential and commercial sector accounts for a much smaller share of
consumption, possibly rEflEcting lower heating requirements in a milder climate.
Figure 3.4
Consumption of Energy by Sector. 1990
Source: Department of Energy, Energy Balance Sheets, Final Consumption.
Table 3.2: Energy Consumption by Sector. 1989 ( per cent)
Belgium FranceGernlany Ireland Spain UK
Industry                   36.3 29.1 34.8 29.7 34.9 25.3
Tr:msport 25.0 32. I 27.8 28.6 42.2 31.9
Households & Commercial 38.8 38.8 37.4 41.7 22.9 42.8
Source: EUROSTAT. Note: Data for Ireland are for 1991.
The tdtimate objective of Irish Energy policy is the nfinimisation of the cost
of energy supplies to the Irish economy. While the possibility of trade in oil and
coal means that, subject to transport costs, market forces should Ensure that prices
in Ireland are competitive with those elsewhere in Northern Europe5 this is not
necessarily the case for electricity anti gas. In both these cases the isolated nature
of the Irish energy supply system has in the past restricted the possibility of
~’leasured in tonnes of oil equiv:dcnl - TOE.
As discussed in DKM (1991) there are competition probtelns with thc domestic distribution of oil pro~tucls
resuhing in substanliMly higher ret:lil prices in lrekmd titan in our near ncighbours.
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competition and it has potentially imposed additional costs. However. gas is in a
more competitive environment than electricity as it faces competition in all
markets from alternative fuels. This is reflected in the pricing policy of Bord Gais
Eireann (BGE), where prices are set in relation to the price of substitute fuels.
Electricity, on the other hand, is in many cases the only fuel suitable for
particular uses having an effective monopoly of such markets.
Table 3.3 shows a comparison of the tax exclusive prices of electricity and
gas to users for a range of countries in 1991. The prices have been converted to
Irish pounds to facilitate comparisons. These data suggest that Irish electricity
prices are certainly not out of line with those of other Northern European
neighbours, in spite of the isolated nature of the Irish system. Generally German
prices are high, reflecting the relatively costly use of domestic supplies of coal
and the cost of protecting the environment. A report for the European Parliament
(1992) estimates that electricity prices in Germany are raised by 10 per cent as a
result of strict environmental controls. France has in each case the lowest price
reflecting the preponderance of nuclear generation in that country.6
Table 3.3: Relative Energy Prices (Ta.v Exclusive), 1991. £1R
Belgium France German.v Ireland UK
£1R per kWh
Electricity - Households          0.09     0.07 0.08 0.07 0.07
Electricity - Industry 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.04
£1R per I0~ Kilocztlories (TOE)
Gas- Households 222.2 249.3 217.8 264.7 208.4
Gas - Electricity Generation 85.4 NA 89.4 59.4 NA
Source: International Energy Agency, Energy Prices and Ta.res
For gas, Irish charges to consumers are, with one exception, the highest of
the countries examined, though the difference is not very marked. It is difficult to
obtain comparable data for prices to industry but the comparisons in DKM ( 1991 )
using EC data suggest that the price difference is not as great as some published
figures might suggest. By contrast, the price of gas supplied for electricity
generation was very low when compared with the situation in Belgium and
Germany.
The relatively satisfactory price situation for gas and electricity in 1991
contrasts with the situation in the mid-1980s when Irish prices were well above
It is probnble their the French prices are biased downwards as they do nm fully reflect the long-run cost of
nuclear energy due to Ihe very large cost of decommissioning.
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those in neighbouriug countries. This may have been partly due to relative
inefficiency. However, an important reason for the difference was undoubtedly
the cost of funding a rapid expansion in productive capacity in electricity and in
distribution of gas. 7 If pricing were done on the basis of long-run marginal costs
then prices would show less variability over time. It would appear that current
prices are below the level of long-run marginal cost. As a result, as new capacity
is installed over the 1990s, financing costs :.uld, therefore, prices will have to rise.
Thus the favourable situation with regard to electricity prices is likely to
deteriorate over the rest of the decade.
This cyclical pattern in relative electricity prices arises from the combination
of the pricing policy adopted and the spasmodic nature of investnlenl in a small
isolated system. When considering the effect of the structure of Ihe energy sector
on Irish competitiveness this must be taken into ~.lcconnl.
As outlined above, while energy prices in Ireland may at present be
comparable with those of our Nortt~ern European neighbours this has not always
been the case. Energy intensive industries did not establish in Ireland because it
’never had supplies of low cost energy and the Irish industrial structure reflects
this. Despite this, as shown in Figure 3.5, the difference between the energy
intensity of Irish industry and that of our neighbours is now quite small. As a
result, the energy needs of Irish manufacturing are now not very different from
those of other EC ueighbours.
Figure 3.5
Energy Intensity of Manufacturing
TOE per lR£m of Gross Output
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Som’ce: lEA, Energy Balances: UN, Industrial Statistics: Departmeat of Energy. Energy
Balance Sheets: CSO. Census of Industrial Production.
This similarity of energy intensity, despite the absence of traditional energy
intensive industries, seems surprising and it requires further study. Possible
explanations are the small scale of most Irish plants and the limited usage of gas
AS fo~cIlsled [11 Scoll t It)SO} lhc expansion of eleclricil)’ capacily was inuch greater Ihlm was warrilrlted by
growlh in demand bolh ¢.1" otiK’ tllld e.~’post.
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by Irish industry compared to industry in other Northerrt EC members. The small
scale of plant means that there is little scope for combined heat and power
generation, an important fealure of some major plants in the other countries
examined.
While the presence of major domestic supplies of primary energy ill the UK
;:rod the Netherlands is ;:m obvious eonlrast with the situation in Ireland, the other
two major factors which make the Irish energy sector unusual are its dependence
on fossil fuels, given the relatively low penetration of gas, and tile isolated nature
of its gas and electricity sectors, hi the rest of this Chapter the importance of
these two factors for energy policy is further discussed.
3. Energy Demand in the 1990s
In discussing tile future role of Irish energy policy it is usefid to make some
forecasts of the likely evolution of energy demand and supply over the remainder
of this decade. The level of economic activity over this period will be the most
significant determinant of energy demand. An outline forecast for tile economy
over the rest of the decade was prepared using the ESRI medium-term model and
a related energy sub-model, broken down by five sectors and five fuel types. This
system was used to prepare a forecast of tile denl;:md for total primary energy
requirements (the data are presented exclusive of electricity). The parameters and
elasticity measures used in this sub-model are b;:ksed on historical relationships
between sectoral growth and energy use in the Irish economy over the last 20
years.
Forecasts for primary energy requirements are presented in Figure 3.6 and
Table 3.4. These forecasts ;:ire based on assumptions about supply considerations,
such as the availability of ;:m increased supply of natural gas through the
interconnector after 1995. and the likely nlix of fuels used in each sector, given
security of supply conditions and environmental target constraints. They also
assume a moderate rise in the real price of energy over the decade.
This forecast suggests thai primary energy demand will increase by over 30
per cent from 1991 levels by 2000. Natural gas is expected to increase its share of
primary energy considerably from 15.4 per cent to 23 per cent in the same time
period, wilh peat accounting for less tllan 10 per cent at the end of tile decade due
to the retirement of some peat powered stations for electricity. The underlying
expectation for this "dash for gas" is that environmental considerations,
particularly the prospect of a carbon tax on fossil fuels, and increased competition
in supply within the EC will favour natural gas use more than Ihe other fossil
fuels. The availability of and demand for non-lossil renewable energy sources.
like solar or wind power, are assumed to remain unch:.mged lot the purpose of
this Ibrecast, along with the potential for energy el’lqciency lake-up.
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Figure 3.6
PrimaO, Energy Use (’FOE)
per ten; ,4 verag¢ ,4nmtal Growth
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Table 3.4: Source of Primary Energy. Tonnes of Oil Equivalent (TOE)
1991 2000
Industrial 22.4 2 1.0
Transport 13.2 9.6
Residential 48.3 45.6
Comnlercial 15.4 23.0
Total 0.7 0.8
The annual growth rates in economic activity as measured by GDP and
electricity demand are presented in Table 3.5. Relatively modest growth is
forecast in the short term, but afler 1995 annual growth is forecasl to be close to 5
per cent per annum The likelihood of a return to rapid growth will have
significant consequences for the energy sector. If we assume that the relationship
between electricity demand and economic growth is simil:ar to what it has been
over the last number of years then demand will have increased by nearly 50 per
cent during this decade. (Tiffs relationship is discussed in detail in Chaptcr 6.)
Such a growth scenario, which ignores the potential of the demand-side
n~anagement and energy efficiency initiatives currently in operation, would
suggest the need for a substantial increase in generation capacily.
Table 3.5: Outline Macro-Economic Forecast 1990-2000
(average atmual growth rates, pet" cent)
GDP 3.7
Electricity 4.3
4. Security of Supply
The objective of security of supply has long been central IO Irish energy
policy, see Convery, Scott and McCarthy (1983). As discussed above this was an
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important factor in the development of the peat extraction industry in the
post-war years. 111 the governnlenl report Energy Ireland, published in July 1978,
considerable emphasis was put on this issue. This was not surprising following
on the experience of temporary shortages after the first OPEC oil crisis.
Security of supply has traditionally had two components: the availability of
primary energy domeslically and the diversification of energy sources away from
dependence on one fuel or a small number of suppliers. These two aspects of
security of supply must be considered together. Just because natural gas comes
from an Irish source does not necessarily make it :a secure supply given thai it is
piped through a single pipeline which is vtdnerable to accidents. Security of
supply is also affected by the possibility of industrial action.
Measured in terms of these two aspects of security, energy policy has been
very successful over the last Iwelve years. The dependence on imported energy
hus been reduced from around 85 per cent in the late 1970s to around 66 per cent
in 1991.s In addition, the dependence of the economy on oil has been greatly
reduced with the gradual diversification of fuel sources. This diversification has
obviously involved a major increase in use of gas; it has also seen a substantial
increase in the use of imported coal.
However, while the current situation on the security of energy supplies,
measured by the proportion of primary energy sourced domestically, is more
balanced than in earlier decades, the situation is likely to change rapidly over the
next 10 years. The exhaustion of domestic gas supplies will itself increase
dependence on imported energy supplies returning the economy to the position of
earlier decades. In addition, in the absence of new investment, the peat industry is
likely to decline in importance.
However, the installation of the gas pipeline will allow use of gas to maintain
its share of demand, though any major increase could prove risky clue to the
dependence on a single pipeline as the indigenous sources are used up. The
integration of the electricity systems on this island could allow some further
increase in the share of gas through spreading the risk of temporary loss of the
pipe-line over a larger system.
The issue of security of supply places limits on the extent to which reliance
should be placed on a single gas or a single electricity interconnector. While
some fom~s of storage can be used to provide u temporary back-up to the g.as
supply, the nature of the storage may pose problems. For electricity, storage is
not an option. This aspect of security is now much more important than the
question of the dependence on imported energy supplies. With the increasing
integration of the EC energy system the issue of domestic sourcing is likely to
decline in importance. The draft EC directives will contribute to this indirectly.
However, just kS portfolios of assets are diversified to reduce risk, the need to
This is c;dculmed by taking Ihe Iotal supply of gas and ix:at as a percenl:lge of prim:try energy used for
energy (non-feedstock) punyoscs.
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maintain diversity of fuel supply to avoid shocks from sudden price changes in
the future remains important.
5. Energy and the Environment
Environmental concerns on trausfronlier issues like acid rain and the
prospects of global warnling have gained much pronlinence over the last decade.
The burning of fossil fuels for energy purposes is a major contributing factor in
both of these problems. Acid rain is fomled by the combination of sulphur
dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions in the air, both of these are
by-products of energy use, particularly from consunlption of coal, peat and oil.
The possible consequences of the "Greenhouse Effect", inducing global wanning
include rising sea-levels and climatic changes. Energy use is estimated to account
for almost 50 per cent of man-made sources of greenhouse gases. The main
greenhouse gas is carbon dioxide (CO.,) which is also a by-product of fossil fuel
use.
International response to these issues has inevitably focused on the energy
sector. Environmental targets have been set and timetabled for this decade and
these will act :.is a constraint on Irish energy policy. The problem of acid rain is
dealt with at an EC level by the 1988 Large Combustion Plant Directive (LCP),
which has targeted reductions in SO, eulissions by 1993. Ireland received a
higher ceiling limit for the power generation than the 1980 baseline level due an
allowance for the then unbuilt Moneypoint plant. The ceiling under this directive
for utilities is 124,000 tonnes of SO~. and our forecasts, presented in Table 3.6,
would suggest that this 1993 target will be easily met (this assumes that coal with
a I per cent sulphur content is used for electricity generation). In addition to
obligations under the LCP directive, Ireland signed the Helsinki Protocol in 1990
at the beginning of its presidency of the EC. This protocol requires a 30 per cent
reduction on 1980 levels of SO, emissions by 1993. In Ireland’s case this would
impose a target for the whole economy of 157,000 tonnes, which our forecasts in
Table 3.6 demonstrate will not be met on the basis of current policies.
Table 3.6: Sulphur Dioxide Emissions (thousand tonnes)
1993 2000
Industrial 66 77
Transport 16 16
Residential 22 24
Commercial 6 6
Utilities 83 I I I
Total 192 234
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Strategies lbr meeting this obligation include the use of low sulphur fuels,
more use of natural gas (a sulphur free fuel) or the installation of desulphurisation
equipment at power plants. McCoy (1991) examined the maeroeconomic impact
of this obligation for Ireland. He suggests that the costs of meeting this objective
may not prove to be too substantial for the economy if gas consumption can be
expanded significantly. However. future commitments need to be carefully
considered.
The Sofia Protocol on NOx emissions called for stabilisalion of 1995
emissions at 1987 levels. Ireland would be extremely unlikely to meet such a
target, see Table 3.7.
Table 3.7: Nitrogen O.ride (NO.r) Emissions (thousand lotmes)
1991 2000
Industrial 19 31
Trimsport 85 91
Residential 7 I 0
Commercial 4 5
Utilities 47 67
Total 162 204
In terms of carbon dioxide emissions the Rio Earth Summit of 1992 failed to
agree on a binding climate change convention that contained firm targets.
However. the EC have proposed targets in a comnmnity strategy to limit CO~.
emissions and to improve energy efficiency. Tile target set is the slabilisation of
Community CO2 emissions at the 1990 levels by Ihe year 2000. As part of that
strategy the Commission proposed a combined lax on carbon and energy. Some
member slales, including Ireland. seek a concession to increase their 1990 levels
in order to pursue economic convergence. However. our forecasts suggest that
h’ish emissions by 2000. even allowing for significant slructur:.d ch:.mges, will be
over 20 per cent above the 1990 target level, see Table 3.8.
The influential Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) have
reported that reductions of about 60 per cent on current emissions would be
required to avert serious problems clue to the greenhouse effect. If a constraint of
this severity was put Oll tile energy sector the necessary structund changes would
be enoFillous.
Carbon taxes of tile magnitude proposed by the EC. the introduction of which
is now conditional on other induslrial blocks taking similar measures, were
shown by Fitz Gerald and McCoy (1992) to be of limited value in reducing CO.,
emissions. However. they did find evidence of the presence of a "double
dividend" for Ireland in such a tax. The dividends are improved environmental
conditions and higher output and employlnent. This productive efficiency gain
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results I¥om the shilling of the tax base from labour to energy; the demand for
energy is inelastic v,,hereas the demand for Iztbour is relatively elastic. The result
is an overall improvement in the competitiveness of the trudz~ble sector.
Table 3.8: Carbon Dioxide Emissions (million tomles)
1991 2000
Industrial 5.16 6.79
Transport 6.24 6.66
Residential 5.92 6.72
Commerciul 2.02 2.34
Utilities 10.94 15.25
Total 30.28 37.75
Incorporating environmental constraints into energy policy has significant
implications for policy makers. In the first instance, the presence of large and
potentially serious environmentzd extermdities associated with energy use can
provide zt legitimate reason for intervening in a free market. In the absence of
iulervenlion the full social costs, private plus external, of energy use will not be
taken into account and this will result in too high a level of energy use. Even
given the uncertainty that surrounds environmental issues like global wzlrming,
policy makers can be justified in taking a "precuutionary approach" in controlling
energy use. The form of control used can be based on either regulations and
standards or a ularkel based approach of taxes and/or tradable permits. Economic
theory would come down strongly in favour of the lalter approach on the grounds
of efficiency, yet there is a predominance of direct regulation in dealing with
pollution matters which "reflects the bias toward the use of the tools of law
enforcement and technical fix to achieve government ends" (Shortle, 1992).
In intervening in the energy ruarkel on environmental grounds policy-makers
must still decide on what is the socially desirable level of energy use. This is a
Herculean IzLsk given that the policy-maker may have no better irfformation than
the market participants. Satisfying the environmental constraint may also lead the
policy-maker into conflict with other goals, like the social obligations to
employment in the peal industry. When concerned about global or international
environmental issues, domestic policy-makers should consider possibilities of
better und che~tper solutions by financing clean-up activities in olher countries.
McCoy (1991) showed that. in terms of Irish macroeconomic performance, the
governrnenl wotdd h:.lve achieved a belter resuh for the h’ish economy zmd Ihe
European acid rain problem by helping finance the installation of
desulphurisation equipment in Eastern Europe thzm undertaking the same
clean-up domestically.
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6. Competition and Ownership
The EC Conlmission proposals are designed to promote energy efficiency by
opening up the EC market and increasing competition. Their emphasis is rather
different from that of the energy reforms of the UK in the 1980s where the crucial
question was that of ownership. The EC Commission proposals do not deal
directly with the issue of ownership but, by auempting to free trade in electricity
and gas, they aim to increase competition.
The problems posed by concentration on the issues of ownership have been
highlighted by Helm (1991). The constraints placed on the reorganisation of the
UK electricity industry meant thai a duopoly situation was creatod replacing the
previous monopoly, with only a limited increase in competition. The resulting
system depends heavily on regulation to ensure that the system runs efficiently in
the sense of minimising the economic rents arising from the structure of
ownership.
As outlined above, the EC Commission proposals involve the separation of
the generation, transmission, and distribution of electricity to increase
transparency in pricing electricity and gas supplies. These proposals recognise
that the transmission of electricity and gas is normally a natural monopoly.
However, it is quite possible to have competition in generation and competition
between major consumers or distributors. It is hoped that by increasing
transparency and allowing increased competition in generation and distribution,
that efficiency can be increased.
Already there are pressures at a European level for increased freedom to trade
energy. This issue has arisen in the case of Germany where major industrial
consumers of expensive German electricity want the right to import cheap
electricity from France or the Netherlands (European Parliament. 1992). If the
new regime were introduced it would pose major problems for the eurretll
German policy of burning expensive domestic coal and would require
considerable changes in the German electricity system.
The introduction of such a regime at an EC level has major implications not
just for the electricity and gas utilities but also for other suppliers of fuel.
Increased competition from abroad or from the liberalisation of the domestic
generation systems will put major pressures on the domestic suppliers of high
cost primary energy: coal in Genrtany and tile UK, peat in Ireland. The
implications of this policy for the British coal industry became apparent in 1993
with the closure of the majority of the remaining pits, raising a major political
storm. It also raises the question as to whether the pricing of electricity from
nuclear fuel takes full account of the clean-up costs associated with its
decoramissioning.
The effect of increased competition will be to highlight the areas where
domestic regulations or hidden subsidies give rise to increasod costs and a loss of
competitiveness. For Ireland, successive reports, Convery, Scott and McCarlhy
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(1983), DKM (1991). and the Report of the Industrial Policy Review Group
(1992) have highlighted the need for transparency in pricing to deal ’,villa the most
obvious sources of increased domestic costs. In :allowing new entry into
generation and permitting large consumers to shop around, the excess cost burden
of peat electricity generation will be highlighted and there will be strong
pressures IO pll.ase oul plant. While Chapter 5 shows tllal the cosl penally of peat
fired generation is aggr:tvated by HIe high level of indebtedness of Bord na M6na,
which represetltS ;.t sunk cosl. the possibility of future competition and
envirormlental regulution makes any new peal fired phlnt unallraclive.
There are a number of possible benefits which may resull from a successful
inlroduclion of competition into certain sectors of the energy industry: it may
result itl lower prices, exerting a strong influence on costs - a potentially serious
problem in a st:ate owned nlonopoly; it in:ly also exert pressure on public policy
to increase transparency and inrprove decision making. While the potential
benefits are obvious, however, il is not ;as clear how effective competition can be
implemented. This Chapter considers the areas of gas and electricity, the areas
covered by die draft EC directives. The DKM report to the Industrial Policy
Review Group (DKM. 1991) dealt with the problems of lack of competition in
tile oil distribution market.
It is extremely difficult to establish the extent to which the current
unregulated nronopoly position of the ESB and BGE h:.l’,,e resulted in economic
inefficiency, hi both cases Ihe very existence of a monopoly reflects the
importance of increasing returns to scale: eonlpetilion in electricity or gas
transmission would be extremely inefficient. However, they both face
competition front other fuels; this is particularly inlportanl for gas. It is only in
certain areas of each business thai compelitior, within the sector (e.g., electricity
generation) is feasible. However, the absence of explicit regulation of any
monopoly must be a caase for concern.
One possible area where one might expect problenls is Ihal some of the
potential monopoly rent may accrue to Ihe enrployees as Iligher pay or higher
staffing than would be possible in a conlpetitive position. F’igure 3.7 looks at
relative average labour costs for the utility seclor in Ireland and other EC
Countries. In this ease average labour costs in utilities are compared with those
in manufacturing in each country. In ever), case COSlS are Iligher in utilities,
possibly due Io the high average skill level of those employed. However, il may
also be attributable to the monopoly nature of the utility sector in Ihe countries
exanrined.9 These dala do not suggesl that employees in Irish ulilities in 1988
enjoyed a markedly nlore favourable situation than tllose in olher EC countries.
In tile case of the gas industry, the extensive use of sub contracting goes a long
way Iow.~lrds ensuring 01:.11 such rents are compeled away.
’~The dala are for 19SS. before the major changes in tile UK could affe¢l the situation ihere.
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In the electricity generation sector developments in technology and changing
market structure have me:.ull a major reduction in staffirJg levels in new plants
abroad compared with current Irish practice. The opening up of the managemen!
of generalion stations to competition could provide an inlpetus to increase
efficiency in this area oftbe industry.
Figure 3.7
Relative Labour Costs
Utilities as a ~ of Mamtfacturing
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Source: EUROSTAT: Labour Costs Survey, 1988
The numbers employed relutive to output in Ihe Irish utilities do appear high
vis-~’t-vis our neighbours. However. direcl cornparison is difficull because of
differences in coverage (treatment of retailing, etc.) and because of the very
dispersed nature of the Irish population served by the transmission systern.
The argument for separating transmission from distribution in the gas system
throughout Ihe EC is potenlially imporlant for Ireland. Wilh tbe construction of a
gas interconnector to the British gas grid we will become dependent on thai
system for a significar~t share of our energy Iowards the end of Ihe decade. This
dependence on a single British pipeline could leave the Irish system vulnerable to
rnonopolistic behaviour by the owner of the British gas grid. The EC directive,
by regulaling Ihe tr:.msrnission system in the UK, and elsewhere in the EC, ,,voukl
help protect the Irish economy from such predatory beh,~lviour. The changes
within the UK gas systenl have already in’Jplementcd sonic of the crucial features
of Ihe EC approach.
h is also important for competition, not only in gas but also in electricity,
Ihat the rtmning of the gas inlercormeetor, :.rod also the dorneslie transmission
system, shoukl be strictly regulated. It should be open to third parties, such as the
ESB or independent electricity generators, to buy gas elsewhere mid Io ship it
through the pipeline, paying only the transmission costs. Without Ihis uccess for
third parties, competition in gas fired electricity gerJeration will not be possible.
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In electricity there ,ire two m:ajor possibilities for increased competition
arising out of the EC directives. First. there is the possibility of new enlr,ints
domestic,lily into tile electricity generation business. Secondly, there is tile
possibility of competition from outside the Republic through new intereonnectors
between the electricity syslem in the Republic and the rest of tile EC.
The scope for increased competition within the domestic system is liolited by
the se‘ile of the system. In the United Kingdom, for example, it is possible to
have many generation Slalions which ’,,’,,ill compete to supply power IO Ille
system. Since the system was dercgul‘ited there h‘is been ‘i very big increase in
the number of g‘is powered Sl‘ilions built to compele for business, the so called
"dash for gas". In the system in Ihe Republic, by contr‘isl, where there ‘ire
effectively only 15 signific‘int thermal Sl:alions, Ihe scope for competition is much
more limited. The size distribution of st‘ilions is sho’.vn in Table 3.9. This sllo’,vs
Ill,It one station. Moneypoint, ‘iecounls for over 40 per cent of tile power
produced. This station is also signific,intly cheaper th,in any other as il burns
coal.
Table 3.9: Size Distribution of Thermal Electricity Generating Stations. 1991
Size r)f Plants. Units Sent Out. Millions Number Millions of Per Cent (~f
Uoits Sent Ota TotaI Sent Out
Less than or equal to 250 7 963 7.4
Greater Ih,in 250 - Less Ihun 1000 4 2106 16. I
Greater I]lUn [000 - Less than 200(I 3 4586 35.1
Greater than 2000 - Less than 10,000 I 5393 41.3
Source: ES B Aunual Reporl. 1991
In any competitive system where .~tll individual phmts compeled for business
the donlin:.ulce of Moneypoint WoLlld rern‘iin ‘incl. given Ihe technology ‘ind
relative fuel prices, ‘ill the power it produced wouh:l still be bought by Ihe system.
If the owners of ~.~ priv~le Moneypoinl v,,erc paid the existing m‘irginal price for
electricity then substanti,iI profits would be obtainable.
The next three biggesl stations account for 35 per cerd of the power
generated. These st‘itious e~ach I1;ave ‘in installed gener‘iting capacity of around
500 MW. Thus in tile existing scheme four stations account for over
Ihree-qu:.lrters of the power produced in the system.
While the structure of tile system :rod tile scale of operation of tile four major
plants would make conlpelilioul diMcult ‘it present, the need to exp‘ind the
system, discussed ‘ibove, does le‘ive scope for new elllr‘illlS to construct
‘idditionul plant IO compete Ior business. Ch:.mging technology means th‘iI
somewllat srn‘iller gas fired pl‘inl, with ‘i c‘ipacity of around 250 MW or less,
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could be economic, representing a scale of investment which might be attractive
to independent operators.
A feature of the current system is that the largest four stations, accounting [’or
over three-quarters of electricity generated, are generally the nlogt efficient
generators on the system~°. The smaller plant, with two exceptions, tire peat fired,
with production costs well above those for all other stations. The effect of
competition with new entrants would initially be to squeeze out the smaller less
efficient plants. Effectively competition, with no other restrictions, would involve
a phasing out of peat fired stations. Probably the major initial savings would
occur from this restructuring rather than from competition pet" se.
The advent of competition would force a choice to be made on whether to
provide an explicit subsidy for peat fired electricity generation stations or to close
tbem. As discussed in Chapter 5, a substantial part of the excess costs of existing
peat stations is due to tile high debt of Bord na M6na resulting from unprofitable
investment decisions in the past. If it were decided to phase out the peat stations
gradually and if Bord na M6na were relieved of tile debt. which is in any event
slate guaranteed, they would be in a better position to compete. However, if they
were to survive they would still require a subsidy.
The issue of competition is intimately related to the connection of the
electricity and gas systems of the Republic to those of the rest of the EC. The
most likely way in which competition could be introduced will be through a
combination of the restructuring of the ESB to separate out generation, currently
under way, and the construction of one or two new gas fired slatiolls. The scale
and capital cost of such plant would be more feasible for private operators than in
the case of large coal fired stations. In addition, the environmental problems
associated with coal would make coal-fired stations an unattractive zmd risky
fOnll of investment.
With the domestic supply of gas due to run out at the end of the decade any
new gas fired phmt will be dependent on the gas interconnector to the UK. This
will present a limitation on the scope for new investment in gas for security
reasons. Currently around 25 per cent of electricity is generated IYom gas. While
up to 50 per cent was generated from gas in the early 1980s, it would be
dangerous in the future to rely on a single pipeline for the fuel needed for much
more than, say, a third of nornlal clectricity supplies. Any accident which
affected the pipeline could cause massive economic disruption. This limits the
scope for new stations dependent on gas to provide competition.
Tile restoration of an electricity intereonnector to Northern Ireland could
provide a number of advantages including an increase in scope for competition.
The cost of such an interconnector is relatively small compared to that for an
interconnector to the UK. The restoration of the existing line in purely econonlic
terms would cost under £1 million while an interconneclor to Britain would cost
l0Only one of the smaller stations h:ls a unil cost bower lhan one of the top four slalions.
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between £250 million and £500 million. Even if security requirements were to
raise the cost of reopening the Northern link it would still provide scope for
increasing competition and reducing costs of electricity throughout the island.
In recent years the cost of electricity has been significantly higher in
Northern Ireland than in the Republic. The Northern system depends on two
stations for over 80 per cent of power supplies, these two stations burning oil and
coal. If the problems with the security of the interconnector could be overcome,
the increase in the scale of the island system and the complementarity of the two
existing systems could provide substantial scope for increased efficiency and
reduction in costs, even before the issue of competition is considered. In the long
tern1 it would be desirable on the grotmds of economic efficiency to move
towards an integrated transmission system for the ishmd.
As an integrated system it is likely that some marginal power plants which
provide reserves for the existing systenls could be closed. The need to keep plant
on standby in the two systenls simultaneously would be eliminated. Scott (1980)
estimated that significat~t savings could be made from these changes alol~te. In
addition, the larger scale of the system woukl provide increased scope for
competition between generation stations. It would also allow a greater use of gas,
the fuel currently favoured in the UK by independent power producers, without
raising the integrated system’s dependence on thai fuel to insecure levels. In
addition, a shift to greater use of gas throughout the ishmd would have
environmental benefits.
The possibility of connecting the existing electricity system in the Republic
Io the UK system also provides scope lot increasing competition and could
potentially provide a number of other benefits allowing a more efficient use of
the existing system. However, the cost of the interconnector, a minimum of £250
million, is a bigh price to pay for these benefits. If the sole purpose of the
interconnector to the UK were to provide additional capacity to the system then
that objective could be rnet more cheaply by building u new domestic power
station, whoever owned it. As oullined above, the current cost of electricity in the
Republic is fairly close to that in the UK. hi so far as cheaper electricity were
zivailable tbrough the intereonnector, it woukl only be because of the overheads
carried by the ESB system due to the continuing use of peat. Unlike the situation
in Northern Ireland, it would appear that the interconnector to the UK would not
be justified to supply base load.
An interconneetor to the British system would confer other benefits by
allowing a reduction in reserves in the system in the Republic and through the
potential for direct imports to provide the possibility for some increase in
competition. At present it seems unlikely that these potential benefits from the
interconnector to Britain woukl justify its bigb cost. The desire to increase
competition within the system may best be served initially through developing
Ihe system along the lines suggested in the EC draft directives and through
seeking to inlegrale the system within the island.
36 ISSUES IN IRISH ENERGY POLICY
While the small scale of the domestic electricity system does not prevent the
introduction of competition in generation, it will make the temls under which
such competition is introduced rather complex. Buying electricity in bulk is not
sonlelhing which can be done oil tile spur of tile moment. Before independent
suppliers are prepared to risk an initial investment of £100 million or more they
must be assured that the lernls on which the electricity will be purchased will be
fair. However, if competition is to have any meaning there must remain sonle
uncertainty as to whether tbe electricity will be bought and wbether tbe
investment will succeed: otherwise there will be no incentive for tile managers of
the new plant to minimise tbe price charged. Balancing this uncertainty ag.:tinsl
tbe riskiness of the investnlent will prove difficult.
In addition, the inlportance of security of supply means that the reliability of
the potential supplier will have to be assured. In planning future capacity accounl
will have to be taken of the potential new suppliers. Some regulation of the
development of new cap,icily may also be required. If a number of independent
contractors simultaneously decide to invest tbcrc could be wasteful duplication
and the new inveslnlent could even exceed the potential for gas supply.
On the other hand, if tile new contractors fail to deliver on pronlises it could
pose nlajor problenls at a future date. The state could be left short of electricity
because a conlraclor failed to deliver on lime or it could be left bailing out an
unsatisfactory private investor because the economy could not afford failure. The
complexity of the contractual arrangements in Ibe UK bighligbt the difficulties in
actually inlplementing a competitive environment. Tile more regulation is
necessary the nlore artificial, and possibly ineffective, the competition. Given the
scale of the electricity industry relative Io tbe Irish system sucb problems are
unavoidable.
The EC directives are generally pushing in the direction which Irehmd would
wish to travel. At a national level there is an interest in free trade in gas. In the
area of electricity tile EC proposals may be less effective because of the costs of
integrating the Irish system into the EC grid. However, tbere is a strotlg case for
encouraging the development of competition in generation within the island as a
whole.
Tile I’ramework which would allow competition in generation to develop is
currently being in’tplemented. This involves tbe separation of generation from
transmission in lhe Irish syslem and the establisbment of a clear set of rules for
purchasing electricity fi’om private suppliers. The extent of such competition
could be increased by selling some of the smaller phmts to private operators or.
alternatively, sub-contracling their nlanagement to new operators. However,
privatisation of the essential monopoly elements of the system, such as
transmission, would do notbing to increase competition and would necessitate a
heavy burden of additional regulation. These monopoly elements include
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transmission, the local distribution nelwork and tile generating slations without
which tile Syslenl could not I’unclion,II
An important uon-energy argunlent frequently put forward for privatisalion is
that lhe proceeds can be used to reduce tile national debt. While there may be
good grounds for privalising some assets to promote competition and efficiency
this particular argumenl is fallacious. ]t ignores the facl thal, when sold, the
state’s assets will fall by an anlounl equal to lhe reduction in its debt leaving no
change in ils net liabilities. ]t is only if the asset can be expected to produce
higher returns to lhe nation in private hands that the sale will benefit the country.
On a priori orounds this can be expecled to happen where lhe entelprJse is
operating in a competitive envii’onmenl.
Tile move Io compelition in generaliou has strong implicalions lot the peat
industry. [l makes the construction of any new plant unaltractive. Existing planl
could continue in operation to tile end of ils usel’ul life if Bord na M6na were
relieved of lhe burden of slule guar.:ulleed debt and the benefit passed on in lower
fuel prices IO the generation sector. Olherwise il is likely in a competitive
environment thul they would be phased oul in favour of other nlore competitive
stations. The social imp]icalions of lhis issue are deah with in tile conclusions.
7. Pricing and Taxation
Pricing
The burden of tile high cost of provision of public services, including the
services of the public energy utilities, posed major problems for the tradable
sector of the economy in the first half of the 1980s. Since then changes within the
economy generally, and increased efficiency within the energy sector itself, have
served to reduce the excess hurden suffered by Ihe tradable sector. For the future
the challenge is to achieve significant further increases in eMciency. However,
even with increased efficiency, because of the isolated nature of the domestic
energy system. Ireland may face higher energy costs over tile 1990s than our EC
neighbours. What should be done about this?
Just because the cost of one of the inputs into tile productive sector of the
economy, energy, may be higher than in other EC countries does not justify
subsidising that factor, either directly or indirectly.~2 To the extent that tile price
difference might represent inefficiency il should be tackled by rcorganising the
sector. However, if it represents a necessary feature of the isolated nature of the
Irish economy it would slill be inappropriate to offer a subsidy to equalise costs.
If Ireland does not have a comparative advantage in energy production then a
subsidy will only distort decisions by the productive sector leading to a
n f’or ex:tnlple, MoneypOinl sl:nion is so central to Ihc syslem thai the ownt’rs of Ih:ll st:Ilion (and Ihe
employees) will still have huge leve~e, however ownership i~; strtlclured.
i: One indire¢l subsidy would be Io .gram :rid energy investmenl under Ihe EC SlrUctural Funds. This wtmld
reduce Ihe fin:racing coSlS of the utililies.
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misallocation of resources. The fact that energy costs are frequently considered
important to industry13 should not disguise the fact Ihal they are only one of a
wide range of factors which contribute to costs and competitiveness. All
subsidies have to be paid for.t~ For Ireland energy is predominantly an imported
factor of production which has significant negative externalities for the
environment. If a policy of subsidisalion of energy for industry were adopted this
would encourage industry to consume additional amouf~ls of energy over and
above the efficient level, giving rise to additional pollution.Is It would also
encourage the productive sector to substitute energy for other factors, including
labour, at the margin. Thus it would be inappropriate to devote resources to
subsidising energy prices when the same resources could be used, for example, to
reduce taxes on labour.
In addition to charging the full private cost of energy to consumers, both
commercial and domestic, there is a strong argument for charging for the
negative environmental externality associated with consumption of fossil fuels.
The pollution, to which consumption of such fuels gives rise, leads to problems
like acid rain and contributes to the process of global warming. This issue has
been discussed in detail in two ESRI papers, see Scott (1992) and Fitz Gerald and
McCoy (1992). Where the externality affects the country as a whole, or spreads
beyond its borders affecting other EC members, the appropriate instrument to use
to ensure that the polluter pays the external costs is a tax. Regulation may be
more appropriate where the pollution only affects a limited geographical area or
where even very small emissions are likely to be harmful (dioxins and
plutonium). An example of this was the imposition of controls on burning of
solid fuels in Dublin.
More complex issues arise in determining the ~ppropriate price to charge
different users of a particular foml of energy. For example, how should the
allocation of overheads be made over the household and the commercial sectors
when determining electricity prices? In principle each sector should pay the full
economic cost for what they consume. However, this is often difficult to
determine. In addition, there is significant cross-subsidisation of energy users in
one region or sector by users in other regions or sectors.
In general, users of electricity in rural areas pay substantially less than the
full economic cost for the provision of necessary services. In Ireland, as in most
other countries, it is considered appropriate not to have significant differentiation
in regional tariffs. As a result, the costs associated with the dispersed nature of
the Irish population hdl on users throughout the system. Generally, if the
~ In 1989energycoslsaccounled for I.Spercentofthevalueofgrossoulpuloflransporlablegoodsinduslries
and 4.1 per Cenl of nel ouipul.
i,, The opporlunity cosl of EC funds is nol zero. It is idenlic~l to the cost of funds Io lhe Irish governnlenl - Ih¢
r’ale of inleresl il pzys on foreign debt.
i~ The fact lhat the elasticity of demand for energy is low may mean Ihal Ibe shorl-lernl effects frfllll dislorling
the price nmy be low. Ilowever. in the longer term the elaslicily of demand is likely to be considerably
higher.
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competitiveness of the economy is the first priority of economic policy, it is more
appropriate that these additional costs, over and above the economic cost of
providing the service, should be charged to the household rather than to the
conrmercial sector.
A final issue on pricing is tile treatment of the natural gas supplies which are
available off the South coast. The Irish government gas distribution company
BGE has the right to buy all this gas at a very low price. Since this gas find
began to be exploited in the 1970s a substantial part of the gas was supplied at
lower than the market price to the state owned fertiliser company NET. This
represented an inefficient use of a scarce resource. As has long been apparent,
with the prospect that these resources will be exhausted by the end of the decade,
the appropriate opportunity cost for this gas is the price of the gas which will be
imported in the future through the gas inlerconnector (McDowell, 1992). This
price, appropriately discounted, should provide the floor price for gas sales to all
users in the Irish energy market.
The position changed somewhat on the sale of the fertiliser plant to a new
company IF’I. NET still receives the gas at a low price fi’om BGE but it then sells
the gas Io IFI at what is stated to be a market price. The profit it makes on the
deal is used to pay the interest on its debts which are, in turn, guaranleed by tile
state. Assuming thin the price charged to IFI is the market price, related to tile
likely price of gas supplied through the intercomlector when it comes on stream,
this involves no distortion of tile market. If NET were closed, ils debts would
become part of the national debt and the higher dividend which BGE would pay
as a result of the sale of gas directly to IFI would go to offset the higher interest
payments.
Subsidies and taxes
Taxes and subsidies affect the price of energy in a range of different ways. In
some cases they may even have conflicting objectives. The two reasons for direct
state intervention to change energy prices are:
¯ To raise revenue.
¯ To correct market imperfections or externalities.
Probably Ihe domin:mt factor in determining the level of taxation on energy
over the last 20 years has been the need to raise revenue. This has resulted in a
range of taxes at very different rates. The taxes are very heavy on oil products,
especially petrol and diesel. Other fuels, especially solid fuels, have been
subjected to a much lower tax or, in the case of peat. a very substantial indirect
subsidy.
Taxes on energy have a major attraction from a public finance point of view:
tile demand for energy is quite price inelastic so thai consumption is relatively
invariant with respect to tile rate of taxation. This contrasts with the elasticities of
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demand for other factors of production, such as labour, and other products, which
have much higher elasticities of denland. Fitz Gerald and McCoy (1992) show
that because of this difference in observed elasticities of demand, a shift from
taxes on labour to taxes on energy would be likely to increase employment and
output in the economy by increasing productive efficiency. Even though Irish
industry would have to pay more for energy, tile bulk of the burden of energy
taxation falls on the household sector, By contrast, in the case of social insurance
contributions, a higher sh:.~re of the incidence of this tax falls on the tradable
sector of Ihe economy.
However, the use of taxes and subsidies to correct market imperfectiol’ls and
externalities shows up a number of inconsistencies in approach. This
inconsistency is not solely a feature of the Irish energy sector but it is also
apparer~l in the lax and subsidy policies of other EC courilries. While the heavy
lax on motor fuels can be explained in terms of the negative externality of traffic
congestion and pollution. Ihe logic behind the differential taxes on other oil
producls, rather than on solid fuels, is not clear. Coal has a more adverse impact
on the environment than does oil when burnt for heating purposes yet coal is
laxed rnore lightly and grants were given to households in the late 1970s and
early 1980s to sv,,ilch to such solid fuels.
A heuvy subsidy has been paid indirectly to encourage peut consumption.
This has been achieved by forcing the ESB to purchase large quantities of peat
for use in electricity generation. This happens in spite of the fact that the fuel is
less efficient for electricity generation and in spite of the fact that it is more
polluting than oil or gas. The reason for this policy is the desire to protect
employment in the peat sector.
As discussed above, the move towards a free market in electricity and gas
will force greater transparency in the subsidisation of peat consumption. Tile
possible introduction of carbon taxes would make the use of peal even less
attractive for the ESBJ° Genendly, there will be considerable pressures in the
future to move away from peat fired electricity generation. However, this
industry is an important source of employment in parts of the Irish Midlands
where there is no other major employer. This parallels the situation in the UK
with coal.
This approach to providing necessary employment in the Midlands is
probably quite inefficient in the long run. It involves a significant on-going
subsidy in the short-term and the continuation of the jobs in the long term woukl
require a substantial increase in expenditure. A more appropriate policy would be
Io use Ihe subsidy to provide alternative productive employment in Ihe region
which woukl come on stream as the existing plant closes down. This additional
employment could be achieved through a diversification of activities by Bord na
~" Although. ~s discussed in Chapter 5, il wou]tJ nol ;lllcz" Ihc ~lddilion:d cost In the n;llion of using i’~eat.
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M6na or through other new ventures. The aim should be to achieve sustainable
enlployment which will continue in the future without an on-going subsidy.
8. Concluding Remarks
This Chapter has concentrated on tile implications for [rel:.md of proposed EC
directives on energy. These directives are pushing Ireland in tile direction that it
would probably wish to travel. There is both the possibility and Ihe need to
introduce competition into tile energy and gas systems. However, this will be
difficult given the small size of the erlergy system of Ihe Republic. [n the case of
electricity, conlpetition can best be introduced by allowing new operators to build
and [ or operate generating stations. The size of these generators should not be
such as to don’tinate the system. In the case of gas, the transmission syslem
should be open to use by third parties. It would not be desirable to privalise lhe
elen’tents of the energy system which are essentially nalural monopolies, like the
tral~sulission network.
In tile long run the energy transnlission systems on this island shoukl be fully
integrated to permit proper competition. II is lime to start planning an energy
policy for the island. Oil the limiled evidence available, an electricity
interconnector to the UK looks like bad value for money. Competition benefits
might be achieved at a lower cost by expanding domestic generation.
Given lhe increasing significance of environmental issues for the energy
sector there is a critical and obvious need for co-ordinated development of
environmenlal and energy policies. The result of increased competition and
environmental regulation will be serious pressure on the petit industry. The
subsidy to this industry should be made explicit. As this industry has poor
long-term prospects but is of considerable social importance in the Midlands,
strenuous efforts must be made over the remaining life of tile existing plants to
find alternative businesses to provide satisfactory long-term employment.
Making the subsidy explicit could facilitate this process.
Users of energy should be charged tile full price of energy. Competitiveness
is better enhanced through measures directed at tile labour market than through
subsidising energy. Tile taxes and subsidies oil energy shonkl he reformed to
rcflect the environmental cost of different fuels. However. because of its low
demand elasticity, it remains a suitable instrument for raising revenue for general
budgetary purposes.
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Chapter 4
ENERGY CONSERVATION IN THE HOME - ARE WE CONTRARY?
Sue Scott~
Preface
This Chapter is about efficiency in the meeting of people’s demands for
warmth, motive power, cooking and the like. Provided that the consumer enjoys
the same level of comfort for the same cost overall, a unit (or kilowatt hour) used
is the same as a unit saved. Therefore conservation should be seen as a
straight-forward alternative supply option (a negawatt) and should logically be
viewed within the ambit of the internal market ideal.
I. Introduction
Recent analyses of carbon taxes have come out broadly in favour of
switching taxes to energy. In general, environmental protection is best served by
market-based measures and, we maintained, measures such as tax switching,
from say labour to pollution, would tend to be more beneficial to society than
other measures. To omit such market-based measures would be to leave in place
the wrong prices - pressures which encourage people to excessive use of the
environment. This is not to say that one should have no reservations aboul such a
policy and the aim of this paper is to address some of those reservations.
Coming to the point, the main reservation is that very heavy taxes might have
to be introduced in order to have any sizeable effect on demand, and that these
could cause considerable disruption and hardship. For markel-based measures to
work successfully, there has to be a well-functioning market in the first place.
This requires the fulfilment of certain important conditions which are easily
The author wishes to thank F. Convery. P. Honohan, B. McSharry, P. Minogue, M. Murphy. K. O’Rourke, B.
Whelan and J. Williams for their assislance.
43
44 ISSUES IN IRISH ENERGY POLICY
overlooked, such as the existence of many buyers and sellers, open access, good
conlnlunicadons, knowledgezlble consunlers. 110 uncellLlinly, price Ir:.nlspal’ency
with no hidden or omitted external costs, tile apl)ropriability of benefits, ztccess to
credit and so on. Brechling et al. (1991) give a failer discussion of sources of
market failure. Reserv~lions about energy taxes anlounl to saying that these
conditions might not prevail.
The sceptic can rightly point to the example of energy conservation in the
home. Here. it is said, there have existed (whatever about today) many highly
worthwhile energy saving investments which have not been taken up - proof
surely of contrary bchaviour on the part of consumers or a poorly functioning
market. This is to some extent true and the aim of this paper is to gauge tile
extent and Ihe nature of lhis problem.
2. Outline of Disc,ssion
We will investigate the issue of non-takeup of energy conservation measures
in the home as follows. First we ask the basic question whether there actually are
worthwhile me:~sures to be undertaken. Nexl we outline a household survey
which we have undertaken with a view to investigating the important features of
market failure. Then. using some preliminary results of the survey, we can look
at households which have not installed energy saving measures and ascertain
some of their characteristics. Some disentangling of influences is then attempted.
Finally. with basically three bro:ld sorts of policies available, namely exhortation
and information, regulation, and price, we c:.m start to see if our su~wey shows
any pointers to ~l logical approach for policy.
3. Are Energy Conservation Measttres A Good Investment?
How worthwhile arc household energy conservation nleListlres? A search for
appraisals of these investments yielded the paper by Minogue (1980) covering
Irehmd, and a few Ibr the UK, including Pezzey (1984). Shorrock and Henderson
(1990) and the Energy Efficiency OMce (1991). Some of their results are
presented in Figure 4.1. where for brevity we have reported only on the
conservation items covered ill our survey.
There are no recent published appraisals for Ireland on general release. To
our knowledge there is no published update of Minogue’s seminal work. except
by O’Rourke (1992) for restricted circulation. There are only summz~ry statements
about energy saving measures, published in information sheets released by
EOLAS. tbe state sponsored board for science and technology. This scarcity of
information is in itself interesting. In the intervening years since Minogue’s work,
though the Gull" War gave us a scare, real energy prices have collapsed. To
counter this. the real price of conservation lechnology might also have come
down. However at current very low real energy prices and high interest rates,
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doubl nlust surround the nel benefits today of sortie of the conservation measures
presented here. It conles ~.ls a surprise tberefol+e Io see froln O’Rourke’s ;111(I nlore
recenlly McSharry’s (1993) prelilninary figures thai :l number of COllserv:ltlOn
nleasures are still highly worthwhile Io Ihe householder today. These are the sets
of figures in the columns headed (5) and (6) in Figure 4.1. In addition it is
not:able bow COllSJslenl the figures are with Ihose from the UK and frolll olber
years. This then does establish Ihal it iS a paradox (hal people have not installed
these worthwhile measures. They have seemingly chosen IO spend more rather
II]an less nloney Oll IheJr conllort levels. If environmental external costs tire added
to the price charged for energy, the nel benefits of conservation measures would
be furlher enhanced.
4. The Household Sttrvey
We tmderlook a survey of households in November 1992 which yielded
1,208 completed questionnaires. The aim of the survey was to find out what
conservation nleagures respondents had or had ilo1 inslalJed and wllelher they
considered Ihal these measLn’es would save money in the long run. Respondents
were asked Io slate what their priority item wotdd be if they bad money to spend
on energy conservation. We explored the reasons for not installing items, trying
to establish, for example, the presence of plain financial constraints ("1 have more
urgent spending priorities"), lack of moliv~lion owing to low price ("my energy
bill is quite small anyway"), hidden costs ("1 do not wanl the mess or hassle"),
lack of access to loans ("it is hard to find the cash or credil-") and inl’onllational
problems ("it is hard to find the time to find out aboul it"). On the last point
about information, we also asked householders what sources of infomlation on
energy conservation they used, such ks ENFO. the environmenlal information
agency, or radio.
The guiding principle behind the formulation of queslions was Io investigate
the extent to v,,hich conditions for a ’.veil-functioning market v.,erc satisfied. Will1
a clearer understanding of the barriers, be they lack of knowledge, information or
access to credit, or perceived hidden costs and the like. policy action if deemed
necessary can be better directed. Another potential barrier to rational investmenl
arises when investors reckon thai they ".,,.,ill be unable to reap the benefits of their
inveslment - i.e. non-appropriability. This can occur if Ihe householder is about
IO nlove house or rents Ihe house, though in the latter case it miglll still be
v.,orlhv.,hile for landlord and tenant to negotiate on the investment, or perh:tps
even for Ihe tenant to proceed anyway if the savings on the fuel bills justify the
outlay. Indeed. questions included lenure as well as the type and age of their
housing, whether they had central healing, and what main fuel tlley used for
space healing and for water llealing.
Figure 4. I : Investment Appraisals of Energy Conservation hems2
1 2 3 4 5 6
Ireland. 1979 UK. 1994
UK.1990 UK. 1991 Ireland. 1992 Ireland, 1993
IRRJ (NPVII¢I~ a goad investment Cost Payback Cost Puyback Cost Np~
~
Life Year~ Payhack
% £ Years £ Years £ £ Years
Lagging Jacket 77 - 135~ 16-51
Attic In, ration 13-28 (50ram) 1-9
16-52~ (IDomm)
Draught Proofing 0-32 O to 2.4
9.32~
In:~ubalng Curtains
Cavizy Wall - 9-19 1-5
Bhx’k Insulati~
Dry Lining of Walls 0-5
Low Encrgy Light Bulbs~
Double Glazing neg-2 (secondary -.7 tu -.2
window~)
up Io 80ram 5 - 8         0.5 6-8 0.3 10 322 IO 0.3
(from<50mm)
up to I $Omm 170 - 280 3-4 I DO- 150 3 200 566 20 3
(from<--25mm) 120- 145~ 2
llO- 190 3-10 20-150 2 150 218 12+ 4
40 - 51 I-3
O-IDO 4
for 80% of all cavity 300 - 400 4-6 II
/1500-3000 20+ 500-1500 3-15180-225~ 2-4
if in fairly 15 I-2
colllthuous u$¢
if repl3cthg anyway 150-530 S.IO~ 500-3000 5-50
120.280~ 4.10~
I 5 30 3.6 1.2
2. It is importanl Io bear in mind the assumptions associaIed with these measures, used by the sources: ( I ) Minogue. 1979. (2) Pezzey, 198.1. summarised in Brechling and Smith(1992).
(3) Shorrock and Ilcndet~an. 1990. (4) Energy efficiency Office. 1991. (5) (YRourkc. 1992. and (6) McSltarry. 1993.
3. IRR -- real interaal rate Of return~ values above S indlcale a good inve.’qtacnl.
4. NPV/K = nel present value / capind cosl. a posltivc value indicales a good in,¢estmenl, sbo’,vln8 hov.’ many llmes you get your mc~ey back.
5. DIY. that is da-iz-you~elf inslallalion
6. NPV = r.ct p~sent value of Eh¢ savings nel of ¢osl~ Of the inve:*lmcnl. A po’~it ivl: figure ind[c~les a good thvt’tqm¢ hi.
7. per item.
8. NPV calculaled by McSharry assumes use of 6 hours per day.
9. If replacth8 window any*eay.
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In addition we were fortunate in being able to ally this survey wilh the
TEAGASC/ESRI Consumer Survey, which is a nationally representative random
sample of households, stratified by area, drawn from lhe electoral register. This
enabled us to obtain other relevant facts about our households including their net
itacome, the level of educalion completed by the head of household, their
occupational status, employment status, age and the numbers of people attached
to the household. The questionnaire for our Energy Conservation Survey and the
questionnaire for the Consumer Survey are available on request.
With limited space on the questionnaire, we concentrated on only eight
energy conservation items in the home. These tire lagging jacket on the hot water
lank, insulation in the attic, draught-stripping of windows and/or doors, thermal
or metallic insulating curtains, cavity and hollow block wall insulation, dry lining
of walls, low energy light bulbs and double glazing. Ideally many other items
could have been included, such as storm porches and double outside doors.
meters and controls. In fact the effectiveness of nlany itenls is often governed by
the manner in which they are used, which is why our question:
"how energy conscious would you consider yourself?"
included a prompt:
"e.g. adjusting time switches.."
Interviewers were asked not to encourage respondents too hard to avoid
saying "don’t know". Unlike in most surveys, absence of opinion here could
indicate lack of information or understanding which is one of our objects of
investigation.
The survey response is satisfactorily representative in terms of fuels used,
accommodation type, date built and tenure, age of head of household, occupation,
level of education completed and income. Over-representation of urban compared
to rural households necessitated reweighting of the results. Households with one
person are under-represented, a common problem with surveys, to be borne in
mind when interpreting the results.
5. Some Stlrvey Results On Take-Up Of Energy Conservation
An overall indicator of ownership of energy conservation measures is given
in Figure 4.2 below. The only items which appear to have been installed in over
half of the houses where the option is available are lagging of tanks and attic
insulation. Houses with no 11ol water cylinder to lag, flats and bedsits which
would tend not to have attics, and houses built with solid or insulated cavity
walls have been excluded from the calculation for the relevant category, because
they would not have had the option. In fact the proportion of households having
cavity wall or hollow block insulation is not a firm figure as respondents are
frequently unsure about it. It should also be noted that the interviewers were
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instructed to report that a conservation item should be recorded as present if the
respondent had any of it. Consequently some respondents may have only
minimal loft insulation or a disintegrating lagging jacket.
Figure 4.2
Energy Conservation, Ownership of Items, %
Data ReJer to Households" Hav#L~ The Ot)tion
Lagging jacket
Attic insulation
Draught proofing
Insulating curtains
Cavity wall Insulation
Dry lining
Low energy bulbs
Doube glazing
20 40 60 80 %
We can compare these ownership rates with those in the UK, for example.
There in 1986, tank lagging and loft insulation was practically total, at 85 per
cent or over (Smith, 1992). Similarly draught-proofing was nearly 20 per cent
higher in the UK.
However Ireland does seem to have witnessed an improvement over the last
seven years. The Fores Forbartha (1988) survey of 1985/6 indicates, for example,
49 per cent ownership of lagging jackets compared to today’s 59 per cent, 52 per
cent for attic insulation conlpared Io today’s 66 per cent and 10 per cent for
double glazing compared to today’s 32 per cent.
In fact our survey asked people in what year they installed their energy
saving items. The years of installation are shown in Figure 4.3 below for each
item. We must allow Ibr the fact that the further back in time, the more the
figures will be reduced by the possibility that people were not living in their
present house. There is still a clear pattern of increased insulation activity after
the energy price rises. The intriguing anticipation in 1972 of the OPEC price hike
in 1973 is actually due to the tendency of respondents to round off in decades,
saying "20 years ago", and the same applies to 1982.
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Figure 4.3
Year of Installation of Consetwation Items
Number of Respondents
8O
6O
4O
2O
0
1971 1975 1980 1985 1990
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The pattern bears out our findings that price has a discernible effect, but
generally after a time lag (Conniffe and Scott 1990, Scott 1991 and 1980).
However the peak of attic insulation in 1982 must also be partly due to the
Department of the Enviromnent’s attic insulation scheme of 1980 to 1982. in
which 29.000 attics were insulated at a cost of £1.27 millions. Also. the pattern
for recent years bears witness to the mid-19g0s home improvemeul grants.
increased advertising of double glazing and promotion by the Electricity Supply
Board (ESB) of items such as lagging jackets and low energy light bulbs in its
attempts to restrain electricity demand.
Who are the people who do not have energy saving items in the home? For
brevity we will concentrate on the households which do not have the first two
items on the list, which are also the n+tost worthwhile, that is lagging jackets and
attic insulation.
Households which do not have lagging jackets and those that do not have
attic insulation, the NOs, are generally similar as one would expect. Looking first
at the household categories which form a high proportion of the NOs compared
to their proportion of the YESes, they are pensioners, people in the higher age
brackets, people with only primary education completed, farmers and the
unskilled, in the lower income groups, live in houses buih before 1918, have no
central heating, use mainly coal for space-heating in winter and rent from local
authorities or own their houses outright. The lasl category is in marked contrast
to people in houses which are owned with a mortgage who form a much lower
proportion of the NOs than of the population at large. This may be because
people with a mortgage have to think constructively in investment terms and
already have gone through the procedure for accessing loans. Proportions apart,
categories which have the largest absolute numbers of NOs are the middle age
groups in full time employment and in middle income groups - understandably,
as these also form the largest section of the population.
It is also useful to know within which household categories there is a high
proportion of NOs, because these may be easy to target. We find that approaching
half of pensioners have no lagging jacket or attic insulation. With the
unemployed, over a half 41o not have lagging jackets whereas well under a half do
not have attic insulation. A half or so of the over 60 year-olds are NOs, for each
of the two items. Some two-thirds of farmers, of unskilled manual workers, of
people below average income and of people who only completed primary
education have no lagging jacket, and some half of these have no attic insulation.
The relationship with education, which has a close correspondence wilh income
level, is striking as Figure 4.4 shows.
Two-thirds of Local Authority tenants 41o not have a lagging jacket and one
half claim to have no attic insulation. However, it may be difficult for them to
know if they have attic insulation, which incidentally became standard in new
Local Authority houses from 1975. For households below average income the
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proportions are about 60 per cent with no lagging jacket and 40 per cent with no
attic insulation.
Figure 4.4
Ownership o fLagging Jacket
by Level o[IEducation of Head of HousehoM
Primary
Group
Inlet Cerl.
Leaving Cert.
Other 2nd Level
Third Level
0 25 50 75 100
Reasons selected for not having energy conser’valion items are shown in
Figure 4.5. Respondents ’.,,,,ere asked to state whether each reason applied or not.
so the), could select a number of reasons.
Figure 4.5: Reasons for not havi g energy cot se " ,ing items
% o[respondents
I. I have more urgent spending priorities 59.0
2. It is difficnh to find the cash or credit 49.8
3. The household financial situation is too insecure 34.2
4. It is difficult to gel round to it 29.4
5. It would not reduce my energy consumption enough 28.0
6. I do not want the mess or hassle 26.5
7. My energy bill is quite small anyway 23. I
8. It is hard to find :r reliable outfit to do it 13.9
9. It is hard to find the lime to find out about it 13.5
I 0.Warm enough 1.8
I I.Want heal for the hot press 1.2
12.Need to consume a minimum to awfil of gas discount 0.9
13.Waiting for period of cheap gas to expire 0.8
14.Other reasons 3.5
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Looking at the reasons wbich apply according Io our respondents, it is not
surprising II1.:11 tile financial reasons feature strongly, II1‘:ll is the first three. For
those below the average income who had no attic insulation, 70 per cent say it is
difficult to find the cash or credit. Perceived poor return (reason 5 "not reduce
energy consumption enough") and non-monetary costs (reasons 4 and 6. "difficult
to get round to it". "mess and hassle") are also importunt for over a quarter of
households. Less than a quarter would cite small energy bill (reason 7). Finding
out about it or finding a reliable outfit do not apply for very many (8 and 9).
Those who are also under-motivated due to cheap gas at present in [’act only
number 9 respondents, though this is 4 per cent of gas customers, and those
waiting expiry of cheap gas number I I. It sbould be noted thai these responses in
Figure 4.5 apply to all households and not just to those who have no lagging
jacket or attic insulation. Further selective analyses are proceeding bul, broadly
speaking, the reasons selected fall into two dorninanl categories. The first is
financial, wbich given the savings forgone, indicates ‘:1 failure in capital markets,
thai is people are not investing because they would bare difficulty in getting
credit. Tbe second is non-nlonelary but covers aspects whicb arc not costless.
such as time and effort. Lack of knowledge of the extent of potential savings,
which we saw are sm’prisingly large, is probably included in both these
categories.
In reply to the question about which item would tbey choose as their lop
priority if they had money to spend on improving energy conservation in their
home. the following ordering was given, shown in Figure 4.6, which again
applies to all respondertls.
Figure 4.6: Top prioriO’ energy conservation item
% ~fholtseholds
Double glazing
Attic insulation
Low energy light bulbs
Draught stripped windows/doors
Dry fining of walls
Lagging jacket
Cavity/hollow block wall insulation
Insulating curtains
Don’t know/no answer
TOTAL ( 1,207 households)
46.7
10.3
5.7
5.4
5.3
4.0
3.7
2.0
16.9
100.0
The proportions will be more relevant when broken down by housebolds
owning different items of energy conservation. As they stand they reveal a strong
potential demand for double gl:.lzing and a ratber weak demand for other more
beneficial investments, where energy saving is concerned, such as draugbt
proofing.
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Sources of inl*ormation used on energy conservation are. in descending order,
TV. newspapers, friends and neighbours, radio, and way down were salespeople,
and only then EOLAS and ENFO. More than haffof those availing of EOLAS or
ENFO had third-level education.
Replies to tile question asking whether an item saves money in Ihe long run
are shown in Figure 4.7. In a sense, in this question, we have asked our own
respondents to give us their rating of the worth of the conservation items which
we call eonlpare with the experts’ ratings ill Figure 4. I. Apart fi’om tile extremely
high proportion believing thai double glazing is a good investment (which may
be true in some cases, though more ill non energy-s~wing terms), the rest of the
ilems’ ralings are in a very similar order as given by the experts, as Figure 4.7
shows. The items are listed in the experts’ descending order of worthiness.
¯ Figure 4.7: Buying the item saves money in the long run
% of respondents saying
YES DON’T KNO W*
Lagging jacket 84.0 9.5
Attic insulation 85.9 I 0.0
Draught-stripping 74. I 15.2
Insulating Curtains 44.7 38.4
Cavity wall/block insulation 53.2 31.2
Dry lining of walls 59.4 29.8
Low energy light bulbs 47.9 40.2
Double glazing 86. I 8.3
* "Don’t know enough about it" was tile wording on tile questionnaire.
Finally despite the quite low levels of conservation items actually installed,
people consider themselves pretty energy conscious overall. Oue Ihird claim to be
very energy conscious, and more say moderately so. Less than a third say they
are slightly or not at all energy conscious, the latter being only 12 per cent.
6, Further Analysis Of h~luences On Take-Up
It is useful to be ;able to assemble the various influences discussed above and
tease oul their relative importar~ce. O[" course some of the influencing I~etors, like
education arid income, will be inter-related so that their relative importance will
not be completely disemangled, but there should be interesting insights to be
obtairLed nevertheless. An example of the type of output given in this exercise.
called LOGIT analysis, is the decrease in the probability that a household in
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private rented accommodation will have a lagging jacket compared to the
probability that a reference household will have one, (the reference household
having to be pre-specified as, say. living in a house which is owned outright).
Some results are reported here.
Looking ~.lt tenure, compared to :a reference household which owns its house
outright, a household in a local authority purchase scheme or having a mortg;.ige
is more likely to have attic insulation. If it is in rented private accommodation it
is less likely to have either attic insulation or lagging jackets, if in a rented local
authority house it is less likely to have a lagging jacket. Ownership of central
heating has a clear positive effect and those using mainly oil [’or space heat are
likely to have attic insulation, these two probably being related. The negative
coefficient for ownership of a lagging jacket by gas users might indic.:tte that the
low price is encouraging waste, as hinted in some of the respondents’ replies.
Alternatively it may reflect an inner city low income characteristic of gas users.
One would also expect people using mainly electricity to have positive ownership
if they have responded to the ESB’s conservation promotions but the evidence is
not there and the numbers are small. By contrast, we note that for the UK, Smith
(1992) finds thai electricity users are significantly unlikely to possess loft
insulation, despite the higher price of electricity compared to say gas. However
he also found that electricity users tended to have double glazing - expensive fuel
and expensive energy conservation going together. Returning to our survey,
respondents who claitn not to be energy conscious and don’t know whether or
don’t think tbat the items save money behaved in a correspondingly logical
manner. Compared to households where only prin’,ary education was completed,
further education has a positive effect, particularly leaving certificate and
third-level education. Higher income bas a correspondingly positive effect.
The predicted probabilities associated with the above :analysis for ownership
of a lagging jacket are shown in Figure 4.8. The reference household owns its
house outright, h.~ts no central heating, uses mainly coal for space heating, is
moderately energy conscious, considers that having a lagging jacket saves money
in the long run and lives in the country.
In addition to the restdts for variables given here, we find a significant
reduction in predicted prob.:tbility of attic insulation, the older the house, though
possibly houses built in the inter-war years are better than those built in the early
post-war years.
There is scope for much more information to be extracted from this survey,
homing in for example on the "don’t knows", the rental sector, the low income
groups and the like. Also not yet analysed is a section in the survey on fuel
efficiency and motoring.
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Figure 4.8: Predicted probabilities o[’having a lagging jacket
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Type of household Probability %
Reference household on £110 per week
" £210 per week (av income)
" £470 per week
Reference household but renting from LA
but not energy conscious
but DK saves money
but is urban dweller
but has central heating
40.7
46.9
62.8
Additional Prob %
-13.3
-12.9
-10.2
¯ +29.6
+25.8
7. Conclusions
At this preliminary stage are there any pointers to policy and is intervention
to be recommended, remembering that the governmen! instruments to hand are
basically exhortation and infornlation, regulation and price?
Our study has reassured us that energy conservation in the home is
worthwhile. If ownership of conservation measures were to be raised to
reasonable proportions, a large number of items would have to be installed. There
is plenty of scope. Figure 4.9 only covers four lypes of item, showing a
conservative number of installations. Their respective, similarly conservative, Net
Present Values (NPV) per item and the overall total Net Present Value are given.
This is simply to give us a rough order of magnitude.
h can be seen that we are talking aboul large potential savings on a one off
basis of well over £300 million, or more than I pet" cent of GNP. for just four
selected items. These opportunities have not been taken up. Our bebaviour is
contrary - an indication of market failure.
If there is market failure now, it will still be there Io some extent if energy
prices rise. Therefore a policy of switching tax to energy without accompanying
measures would not be totally satisfactory. We have shown that there are
indications of lack of information. We coukl find no generally available up to
date investment appraisals of energy conservation in the home. While households
tire a good judge of their own non-monetary costs, it is nol easy for them to do
the complicated monetary calculations of NPV or Internal Rate of Return (IRR).
Energy conservation is a once-off investment and economies of scale are forgone
if each household separately undertakes the analysis, even if it were capable of so
doing. It makes sense for a central body to undertake this and publish the
findings. If people do not know that investing in an item is worthwhile, they do
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not demand it. Suppliers get discouraged, research is discouraged and we have a
self reinforcing sub-optimal state. Significant proportions of our respondents "did
not know enough" or thought items wotdd not save nloney - 26 per cent in tile
case of draught stripping, for example. Tile same can happen in reverse if people
over-estimate the benefits - 86 per cent would install double glazing as a priority
for "improving energy conservation". We have seen that people who have had
shorter periods of education need to be targeted, through the media they use as
well as through stronger promotion of information schemes such ,’is EOLAS’s
Energy Phone.
Figure 4.9: Conservative calculations cf NPV of 4 items
hems (thousands) NPV per item Total NPV
(£) (£m)
Lagging jackets 300 322 97
Attic insulation 200 566 I 13
Draught proofing 400 218 87
Low energy bulbs 500 30 15
TOTAL NPV OF 4 ITEMS: 312 million
We have also shown that non-appropriabilily, this is inability to reap most of
the benefits for oneself, is a factor. Non-appropriability applies to households in
rented properties for example. They are significantly less likely to invest in
energy conservation (for instance, do we turn off the office lights?). This is
separate fronl income considerations it appears. There is a case for regulation
here perhaps, though targeting the privately rented sector is not easy. It would be
interesting to see how dwellings in this sector would bc rated by the rating
scheme. NICER (National Irish Centre Ibr Energy Rating), for example.
Belatedly, regulations have tightened up building standards. We saw how unsure
respondents were on items like cavily wall insulation. If house purchasers are
unable to specify that they want indisputably worthwhile I~atures in their homes.
the authorities obviously have to step in with regulations.
Our survey has also shown that income is, as expected, an imporlanl factor,
though if the credit market operated smoothly this should theoretic:ally not be a
strong influence. The fact is that low income households do not have reasonable
access to credit. There is another spiral at work here. We saw that households
with central heating did have conservation items. As big energy users the
investment presumably pays handsomely. Without insulation, poor households
are losing heat, so useful heat is expensive, consequently they use little of it.
Hence investment in conservation is perceived as "not worth it", which indeed it
might not be. If they had access to credit and could insulate, they might use more
energy. Is that a problem ? No, welfare is improved so it is still worth doing.
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Price measures have been used by government in the past to help pcople with
the financi:.d cost. The attic insulation scheme introduced in 1980. for example.
g:tve grants :mlounting to £1.27 million in 1980-82. The home improvement
grant schelne of the mid-1980s spent £40 million on doors and windo’.vs. It is ilol
clear how much was spent on double glazing. The ESB offers free credit and
cut-price deals on energy saving items. Though no detailed analysis of take-np
has yet been undertaken, they appear to be availed of more by file high income
groups. Other price measures are being used to a small extent a! present through
Energy Action. which with the aid of :l govemfnent grant insulates houses of the
elderly Ibl" free. Energy Action have insulated over 4.500 houses, mostly in the
Dublin area.
AsseSSlllellt of these conservation schenles can only be tentative but they
appear to have had some success. If one’s aim is to achieve mosl energy saving tit
nlinimunl cost to tile state, it m,~ly be a sensible strategy to larger big energy users
who are easily alerted - that is the categories who have already shown a tendency
to install energy saving nleasures. On Ihe other hand other groups who have not
yet bought their houses but ;.ire likely to become large energy consunlers of the
future, these too should be alerted, especially because when they become house
buyers they can press their denland for conservation fcali.n’es. Meanwhile low
income households should also be helped with grants for insulation ;.Is a welfare
measure and Local Authority houses should be supplied with lagging jacketS. In
olher words a broad policy of several measures is called for.
Behaviour of course is the final delermin:.mt of energy use. Leaving doors
open, opening windows ralher thar~ removing the pullover, omitting to adjust the
timeswitch or themlostat have adverse effects. Such behaviour is influenced by
price.
In general we know thai price does have an effect on energy demand and thai
pollution laxalion is sensible, but what we show here are the areas where snags
could be encountered and why. There have been slate interventions over Ihe past
decade or so to address these snugs. These interventions h:.tve in [’act beer~ in the
right areas but on a nlinor scale zn’ld il is not clear Ihat they were targeted
correctly, either to the right items or right people. With the possible switching of
taxes iz’~ the future to pollution and hence to energy, there now needs to be a
reassessment of past state actions and slrenglhening of Iheir eflk:cliveness in tile
light of our current knowledge.
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Chapter 5
THE IMPACT OF A CARBON "FAX ON THE COST OF PEAT
ELECTRICITY GENERA TION
0na Nic Giolla Choille’, Trinity College Dublin
I. lntrodttction and Background
The European Conlnlunity (EC) has come to have a considerable influence
over the energy policies of its member states. To date, its main concerns have
been to increase the degree of competition in the internal energy markel and to
lessen the environnlental impact of energy use. These objectives are likely to
continue to dominate the Comnlunity’s energy policy in future. The traditional
energy policy goals at national level have no! yet received as much attention at
EC level.
As the EC’s inlluence over Irish policy increases, it is important to reflect on
how the changes in policy emphasis emanating from Brussels will imps’tel on the
energy scene in Ireland. hi contrast with the Cornnlunity’s approach, the Irish
energy sector has been influenced by a policy regime which, until recently, has
stressed the more traditional objectives - low cost energy, security of supply,
developrnent of indigenous energy resources and diversification of sources of
supply.
Tllanks tire due to John I:itz Gerald of the ESRI. for practical assJslance, conslrtlctive eonlmenls and advice
in the prep:knltion of Ibis p:kper and the dlsserlalion on which it is based. I ~m :dso grtJteful to colleagues in
Analysis Secllon. Department of Finance. the Ocparlmenl of Slatisdcs, Trinity College Oublln. the
Depalamenl of Energy. the Environmenl Unil of the ESB. and Bord na M6na for inform:ilion provided and
u,ca~ful eonln~enls. Any errors made are, of course, my own. The dissert;nion was submiued for the Public
Seclor Analysis course al the Department of Slulislics. Trinily College Dublin. Parllclpanls on the Public
Seclor Analysis course ,~re sponsored by Ihe Deparnnenl of Finance. The writer is Analyst for the
Committees’ Secretarial of the Houses of Ihe Oire~lchlas: however, neilher Ihe dissert~ltion nor the paper
necessarily represent Ibe views of the Departmenl of Finance. Ibe Office of the Ilouses of Ihe Oireaehlas nor
any of ils Comminees.
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The use of peat as a source of primary energy and for electricity generation is
a feature of the Irish energy sector that is unique in European tenns.
The peat industry has had a significant role in the social and econonlic life of
the Midlands and West of Ireland, admittedly at a cost to the nation. The
implications of EC energy policy for this industry have not yet been
comprehensively addresse~l in public.
This Chapter takes the example of a particular EC energy policy measure
aimed at the environment - the proposed carbon tax - and looks at how it might
affect the cost of peat electricity generation to the economy.
The aim of this Chapter is to highlight the kind of issues involved for energy
policy decision-making, both in relation to the tax and the future of peat
electricity generation. Definite conclusions or recommendations on particular
courses are not made here. However. it is important to identify the issues that will
arise for Ireland as EC energy policy is being formulated, so that potential
problems can be addressed at an early stage. This especially applies to the carbon
tax proposal, where negotiations are continuing.
The structure of the Chapter is as follows: first, the cost of peat electricity
generation to the economy in 1990 is calculated: second, aspects of the carbon
tax are set out and the impact on the cost of peat electricity generation is
discussed; the final section reflects on the benefits that the peat electricity
generation programme have provided and draws some conclusions.
2. The Cost of Peat Electricity Generation
At present, peat is the most expensive fuel for the Electricity Supply Board
(ESB) to use for electricity generation. A comparison of the ESB’s unit fuel costs
in 1990 shows that the average unit of peat-fired electricity cost 3.46p, almost
twice that of oil- or gas- generated electricity (I .76p or 1.75p respectively)2, and
almost three limes thai of coal ( 1.21 p).
Many reasons are advanced for the difference in the ESB figures between the
cost of peat electricity and the cost of electricity produced from any of the other
fuels it uses. The main ones are the relatively low conversion efficiency of peat
and the high cost of the peat.
Peal is transformed into electricity at a low level of efficiency relative to
other fuels in the ESB’s generation system. In 1990, peat was converted to
electricity at 26 per cent efficiency; the efficiencies tot the other fuels (coal, gas
The ESB’s Annual Report and Accounts for the yenr ended 3 Ist December 1990 lists the unit fuel costs for
all 15 them~al st:Jtions in the ESB’s generation system. Oldl fuel costs measure fuel expendilure [:,er unit
electricity outpw pro~luced (Kwhr): for example, the unit fuel cost of a peat station is the peal electricity
outpul of that st:ltion divided by the cosl of the peat used to produce thzl outpul, The aver’age milled pe~a
figure is derived from the Anuu:d Rel~rt by dividing the Iolal number of electricity unils prt~luccd from
milled fat by the ESB’s total expenditure on milled peat.
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and oil) varied from 36 per cent to 39 per cent. The low efficiency is, iri turn,
partly a reflection of the age distribution of peal plant as technological advance
has steadily increased tile efficiency of new thermal gellerating stations. In
addition, as plant ages thernl~.d efficiencics decline. At present, almost
Ihree-qu:.triers of peat capacity is over 20 years old, much older th:.m the
generating plant which burns coal, oil and g~as, so thai pelt’S relatively lower
efficiencies are not surprising.
The cost of the basic fuel input - peat - is also reflected in the ESB’s unit fuel
costs differential. If Bord na M6n:.t, the state owned peat industry, is to break
even, all its costs must ultimately be covered by the revenue it receives from its
customers, the ESB among them. Tile cost of the peat to the ESB is then, in turn,
a re|lection of Bord na M6na’s m:.tjor costs, which comprise labour - clue to the
labour intensity of milled peal harvesting - and debt interest. While Bord na
M6na’s costs are passed on to the ESB and ultimately reflected in the cost of
peat-generated electricity, detailed analysis is required to clelermine whether the
underlyir~g costs reflected in the electricity unit costs are truly costs as far as the
economy :.is a whole is concerned.
There is also a differenlial between peal and the alternatives as regards tile
other costs of electricity generation, apart from fuel. Since the process of peat
eleclricity generation is more labour inter, sive than thai from other fuels, there is
a labour unit cost differential: ESB figures (ESB, 1991) show that nlanning levels
in peal stations were over three limes those of the oil stations and over four times
those of the coal and gas stations in 1990. These staffing levels reflect to a certain
degree the comparative age of peat ph’Int, as manning levels at all stations have
decreased over time. The age factor also results in higher maintenance costs al
some of tile older peat stations thai1 at newer stations b:.tsed on alternative fuels.
Individual Stations
The unit fuel cost differenlial is an average of the five milled peat stations in
the ESB’s system. Figure 5.1 conlpares the unit fuel and works costs of all 15
stations in the ESB’s thermal generating system. II shows that there is a
considerable variation in tile size of Ihe fuel cost difl~::rential between the different
stations in tile system. For example, Tarbert oil-generating station is 1.38p
cheaper in fuel cost terms than Lanesboro (a relatively new milled peat station),
but almost a penny cheaper again (2.29p) than Ferbane, most of which is almost
30 years old. The difl’erence in tile size of the fuel cost differential reflects tile
inlprovements in efficiency thai have occurred and tile age of tile slalions.
Lanesboro ix a relatively new slation (half commissioned in 1983 and tile other
half in 1966) and operates at an efficiency higher than tile milled peat average of
26 per cent. Ferbane has a lower th:.m average efficiency.
62 ISSUES IN IRISH ENERGY POLICY
Figure 5.1 : Baseline Cost per Unit of Electricity Sent Out
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Unit works costs measure total non-capital costs per unit of electricity
produced. Non-capital costs conlprise fuel, labour, maintenance and rates, The
ESB slate that it is inadvisable to conlpare unit works cosls as direct indicators of
station perfonmmce. This is because the other components of works costs, apart
from fuel, are essentially fixed. Therefore unit works costs reflect the level and
type of usage of the plant. The more a station produces re[alive to its potential
output, the lower the unit works costs. For this reason, a comparison between
similar stations, one used to produce only hall’ of its total potential output,
another which is used for maximum production, is not valid. Each station must
divide similar levels of fixed costs over different outputs. The type of usage of
tile plant is also a [’actor. If similar outputs are produced in one station
consistently throughout the year and in another in short bursts followed by long
periods of inactivity, costs will be higher in the latter. This is because stopping
and starting production are the costly parts of the generation process.
Cost to the Nation
The next task is to move from the cost differential between a single unit of
peat fired electricity and th;.it of other fuels to a general cost to tile nation of peat
generation. The cost has been calculated in a number of exercises so far, for
example, Scott and Convery (1989), DKM (1991), and Lang (1983). The
approach has been to assume th;:’tt there is a cost penalty on tile Irish economy
equal to the pe:at output multiplied by the difference between the cost of
producing that peat output in a peat station and the cost of producing it
somewhere else. It has therefore been calculated by multiplying some version of
tbe cost differential by the peat output involved.
The assunlptions underlying the transfer to a cheaper location nlust be
exanlined so that tile correct differential can be selected, h was asstu’ned that an
immediate and hypothetical cessation of peat generation happened in 1990 and
the cost of peat electricity generation was esthllated by calculating the cost saving
which would accrue. If the peat stations were closed, their output of 2000 million
units of electricity would have to be produced elsewhere. Whether a net cost or
suving would result depends on the difference between the cost of peat generated
electricity and that of ahernatives.
Since this potential saving is forgone because peat generation is, in reality,
m;.dntained, it is taken to be equivalent to the cost of the continuation of peat
electricity generation. It was necessary to allocate tile electricity generated from
peat to an alternative generation option under Ibis scenario. It was decided for
simplicity to distribute the peat output to existing stations, by assuming that the
peat output coukl be accommodated within the current generation system,
without any potential capacity constraints. In this way, the capital cost
implications of the need for investment in additional capacity could be ignored.
Since the assumption regarding absence of capacity constraints would not be
tenable over a number of years, the exercise was carried out [’or only one year.
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The Tarbert oil station was selected as the alternative source of the peat fired
electricity for the following reasons:
¯ All stations underproduce electricity for system reasons, but the oil stations
in 1990 produced far less output in relation to their potential than the gas
stations did. Therefore the gas stations had comparutively less available
capacity for producing additional electricity than the oil stations.
¯ Even if they had available capucity, some of the gas stations are too small -
Marina and North Wall for example - to take on the total peat output.
¯ There are constraints on any additional electricity coming from gas arising
from the fixed quantity allocated to electricity generation; the supply of
gas to the ESB is exogenously determined and it could not easily purchase
more gas in tile short term.
¯ Future gas supply is limited in the medium term. unless new supplies are
discovered, until the intereonnector conlmellces operations.
¯ A costing based on Tarbert would be reasonably representative. In 1990,
Tarbert was cheaper in fuel cost per unit terms than Aghada, Poolbeg and
North Wall stations (all mixed gas/oil stations) and Great Island (an old oil
station) and more expensive than Marina (a gas/oil station) and
Moneypoint (a modern coal station).
¯ There is no scope for coal-generated electricity to take up the slack because
Moneypoint is already producing the maximuna level.
¯ There are only two oil stations - Great Island cannot contribute a
significant proportion of the output needed because of its relatively small
size.
¯ Tarbert on the other hand only produced 20 per cent of its total potential
capucity. If it produced to the level of 70 per cent - comparable to the load
factor at Moneypoint - it could have accommodated the peat electricity
output.
¯ Transfer from peat to oil illustrales a tension inherent in energy policy
because it involves a trade-off belween a high cost indigenous resource -
peat - and a lower cost imported source - oil. In this way, the trade-off
between security, dependence and social benefits on the one hand and least
cost on the other is illustrated.
While the transfer of peat output to an existing station could be feasible now,
it is unlikely to be so in the future. As electricity demand rises with II’ie growth iri
national output and as the peat stations approach retirement, decisions will have
to be taken on providing additional peat generation capacity and/or replacing peat
capacity with generation capacity based on an alternative fuel. The cost
calculation is likely to be totally different in this case, because it depends on
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future trends in the prices of alternatives fuels, technological developments in
peat electricily generation and its alternatives and the costs of various
envbonmental standards as they will apply to generation stations in the future.
However, the principles used here could be adapted to that exercise.
There is no treatment in this Chapler of the implicalions for the Exchequer in
the costing of a transfer to Tarbert. For example, the gain to the Exchequer of the
additional excise duty on the increased quantities of imported oil and the loss of
peat workers’ social insurance contributions are ignored. Neither is Ihe impact of
the additional taxation on the finances of the commercial stale energy companies
discussed. It is importanl to hole thai whal might be an additional cost. fronl the
perspective of the commercial state energy companies, might be balanced out by
a gain elsewhere, in the energy seclor or in the economy as a whole. For example.
an increased yield from energy taxation collected I’rom the state companies, and
seen by them as increased costs, provides additional resources for reducing
laxation elsewhere or increasing Exchequer expenditure.
No attempt is made in this Chapter to include an estinmte of tile
environmental costs caused by peal electricity generation. To tile extent that the
transfer Io another fuel type would reduce environmental damage, the amount of
tile cosl savirlg would increase beyontl that shown in the calculations below.
Tile Calculation of the Gross Fuel Cost Saving
Having chosen the station to which the peat output is to be trar~sferretl, tile
calculation of tile saving in fuel costs is, in simplified form, the difl~zrential
between the unit fuel cost at Tarberl and the average peat unit fuel cost multiplied
by the total peat output, as shown in Table 5. I.
Table 5. I: Calculation of Gross Fuel Cost Saving
Peat Electricity A yet’age Unit Unit Fuel Cost Total Fuel
Outlmt Fuel Cost Of Of Cost Saving
Peat Tarbert Outpttt
2,000 m unils * (3.46p 1.736p) = £34.5m
In order to take the analysis ftH’ther, there are three clueslions to be asked:
" does the fuel cost sltving represenl it genuine sltving to the economy?
are there any further savings to be added to the saving in fuel costs?
are there any additional generation costs arising at Tarberl to be offset
against the saving?
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In order to answer the first question, it is necessary to exclude sunk costs and
depreciation - only cash items represented real savings.
Sunk Costs
The treatment of sunk costs is a distinctive feature of the ‘’malysis presented
in this paper and an :.tttempt was made to identify and exclude them tYom tile
computation. In general sunk costs are excluded from computations of this type
because the money h‘’ls alrezldy been spent and the various alternatives under
review n’take no difference to Ihe fixed costs. Bord na M6ua’s debt service costs
for its State-guaranteed borrowings are sunk costs. Much has been written about
how these borrowings arose and the difficulties posed for Bord na M6na by its
current debt burden (Tithe an Oire‘’tchtais, 1991)3. The important point is that the
interest costs arise in relation to capital already spent ‘’rod the debt service costs
would still have to be reel by the Exchequer and the economy, even if the peat
electricity generation programme was discontinued. This is because the
borrowings on which they are payable are State-guaranteed. The significant
question is to delermine whether, and, if so, to what extent, the continuation of
peat electricity generation makes a contribution to these fixed cosls.
It has been stated above that the pe‘’lt unit fuel costs reflect the price of peat
charged by Bord na M6na to the ESB as well as peafs low efficiency. This is
because the revenue Bord na M6na receives from Ihe ESB for the quantity of peal
supplied must enable it to cover all its costs. Since Ihe price of peat enables Bord
na M6nu to meet both its debt service and depreciation costs, the unit fuel costs
based on thai price include sunk costs and non-cash flow items. On exclusion of
these items (Bord na M6na inleresl and depreci‘’Ltion conlbined umounl to £28.9m
in 1990) from the gross fuel cost saving of £34.5m, the net fuel cost saving
comes to £5.6m.
h is also necessary to pose the second and third questions. Would there be
any additional savings as a result of the switch Io oil and v,,ould there be any
additional costs arising at Tarbert to be offset against these savings? Stuff and
mainten‘’mce costs would no longer be incurred at the peat stations, giving rise to
further s‘’lvings over and above the fuel costs. In addition, the ESB slate that the
increase in Tarbert’s output could have been absorbed at little or no additional
staff or maintenance cost there. Therefore, the transfer would resull in peat
stations’ tot‘’d costs under these headings (£24m in 1990) being saved without any
additional costs arising at Tarbcrt. bringing Ihe estimate of the tolal saving on
cessation of peat electricity generation to £30m approxim‘’Ltely (£24m plus
£5.6m).
The net suving forgone o1"£30m may be viewed as the annuul short-term cost
of peat electricity generation. This cost burden is passed on to electricity
consumers in the form of higher electricity prices. Consumers may be seen ,’is
providing an indirect subsidy to peat electricity generation through the higher
The discussion of Bord na M6na’s debt burden in this report is especially useful.
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prices. The above calculations have been based on the differential between the
average milled peat unit fuel cost and Tarbert unit fuel cost. but the outcome does
not differ if the individual peal station’s costs are used inslead. The details of tile
calculations based on the stations’ costs are contained in the Appendix.
The Future for Peat Electricity Generation
Peat electricity generation will continue into the future, despite the cost
burden it imposes on the economy. This clashes with one of the goals of energy
policy, the requirement for low cost sources of energy. The continued use of peat
as an energy source is supported by Government because the extra cost is seen as
counterbalanced by certain benefits to the economy in terms of security of supply
and social benefits in Midland areas. For the short Io medium term, it seems
likely tha! peat electricity generalion will continue and that the ESB would
appear to be a guaranteed market for peat - the companies finalised a contract in
1990 governing peat deliveries for the five year period from 1991 to 1996. It is
not known whether the ESB will continue to purchase peat for generation after
1996. As long as peat electricity generation continues, using the same amount of
peut and the current plant, tile economy will bear a cost burden in the region of
that calculated above, but will also obtain the associated benefits. However, Ihe
long-term outlook for peal electricity generation is uncertain. This is due to the
age of peat plant and new directions in energy policy, at Irish and EC level.
The increasing influence of the EC on Ireland’s energy policy threatens the
long-term future of peat electricity generation because of the differences in
emphasis between EC and national policies. The greater priority attached by the
EC to environmental protection and free trade in energy markets has already been
noted. The completion of the internal energy market and the encouragement of
free Irade in energy products where possible will run counter to the practice of
continuing Stztte subsidies to public energy companies operating throughout the
Community. In a competitive market, peat generated electricity ,.’,,ill have to cost
a similar amount per unit as thai generated from other fuels, because otherwise
private generators will not use il and/or private dislribulors will not purchase it,
when they can turn to cheaper alternatives. The increased environmental
dimension will threaten the indigenous energy-using or producing industries
based on heavily polluting fuels, by the issue of new directives containing
standards and regulations that heavily-polluting energy industries will find costly
to comply with.
Even if these energy policy factors do not operate Io the total disadvantage of
peal electricity generation, its continuation at the current level into the future
depends on the construction of new peat generation plant. Much of the present
peat generation capacity is clue to be retired in the short to medium term. A
decision will have to be made soon to replace plant clue for retirement with either
new peal or alternative plaz’Jl; in the latter eventuality, the amount of peal
electricity generalion would be reduced. Any proposal for the replacement of
retired peat capacity with a new peal slalion will presumably be Ihe subject of all
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economic and energy policy :.tssessment. There are many l~ctors affecting the
comparisor, of the capital and running costs of peat generation c~apacity with
alternative fuel options. Cor, sideration of these factors is beyond the scope of this
paper, but lhe issues involved would include the following: the future outlook for
alternative fuel prices; the technical and economic feasibility of improving
efficiency in peat electricity generation; future direclions of EC energy policy;
the method of financing the replacernerJt capacity.
In conclusion, peat electricity generation imposes it short-term annual cost on
the economy, estimated at £30m via increased prices faced by electricity
consumers. Future trends in EC environmet’Llal control and free trade directives as
they relate to electricity generation may restrict h’eland’s discretion to protect the
position of the peat industry in this way. Ar~y analysis of the economics of new
peat capacity must be conducted having regard to the full energy policy context,
at both Irish and EC level.
3. The Impact of a Carbon Tax
As has been stated, the EC’s energy policy places particular emphasis on the
envirorm’~ent and competilion. This policy is not yet comprehensive. The full
range of policy objectives found at national level, including the traditional
objectives of energy policy, security of supply, diversification of fuel types and
protection of indigenous energy industries is not covered. The ECs attempts to
develop policy in the competition and er~vironmental areas have. to date.
addressed only two components of a mulli-faceted problem at national level,
Flelm (1991).
The EC has adopted a target of stabilising the c~.~rbon dioxide (CO...)
emissions resulting from energy use and has proposed a t.:tx on energy use to
achieve this target because of its concern with the environment. The rete:Lse of
CO7 into the atmospbere - resulting from energy use, cerlain industrial processes,
deforestation, etc. - is thought to have a role in increasing global temperatures
gradually over time. a phenomenon known as global warming. The effects of
global warming are unpredictable but may lead to serious consequences for future
generations in changing global climate, settlement patterns and agricultural
practices. There is widespread agreement II1.:11 it is worthwhile to attempt to
prevent any I’tnrthcr deterioration. For this reason, the EC has addressed the
contribution of energy use to this problem by proposing a number of measures.
including a carbon lax on energy use.
In economic terms, the objective of the carbon lax is to make the cost of
energy reflect the environmental externality caused by its CO., emissions. By
imposing the tax, policy makers would hope to internalise the contribution of
energy use to the cost of global warming. This is done by adding to the private
market cost of ex’~ergy currently borne by energy consumers an amount intended
to represent the cost of its contribution to global warming.
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It is proposed that the carbon lax would apply to the input Ihat causes tile
environmentul impact, rather thun on the actual pollution or emissions as is
normal with pollution taxes. It is easier to tax the input giving rise to the invisible
pollution in this case. There is, as yet, neither a technologically nor economically
feasible melhod of extracting and disposing of the C02 resulling from fuel
combustion. Therelbre the ahernutive option of designing u subsidy to encourage
expenditure on sucll abatement of CO2 emissions does 11ol arise al present.
Effect of Carbon Tax
The Commission hopes thai producers and consumers would reduce their use
of carbon-rich fuels - peat, lignite, coal and oil - after the imposition of the tax.
This is expected to happen because of the increase in the cost of consuming those
fuels: carbon coutern would be part (or all) of the basis for levying the lax. The
tax would therefore provide an incentive for energy users to economise on the
quantity of carbon-rich fuels consumed and/or to substitute for them fuels of a
lower carbon content, such as gas or renewable energy. By reacting to the ta× in
these ways, producers and consumers could reduce their carbon tax bills and
sinlullaneously generate less carbon dioxide emissions.
AlterrJ:nively, SOll’ie energy COllSUUlers nlay continue to use tile saule anloun[
and lype of fuels as they did prior to the imposition of the tax and opt to bear the
tax burden instead. The fact thai an exlerriality tax is not assured of success in
changing behaviour is one of its drawbacks. In contrast, other measures such as
quota restrictions, provision of information, regulation, etc. may be more
successful in this regard, but they also have their associated disadvanlages.
Quotas sometimes achieve the target level of output at a greater cost to the
economy Ihan is necessary.’t The carbo~l lax is only one part of the EC’s "no
regrels" slralegy.
Many Versions of tile Tax
Many aspects of the lax proposal have to be finulised; those details which
v,,ould impact on the cost of electricity generation include the tax basis and the
method of calculating the tax on electricity generation. It has not been decided
whether the tax should be calculated on the carbon or energy content of a fuel or
Re~ul:lliOns life more llppropriale where tl fixed targcl nlusl be illel over ii shorl Iilne period, wh~llevel" Ihe
cost. They ustmlly involve a fixed tlUOta being ~lpplied tll e;ich Iqrnl ¢Jr household reg;irdless of circtmlslances.
The problem wilh this is that firms c:lnnol a(ljusI their pollulion control expenditure Io lbe poinl where ils
marginal benefit equ:ds ils m;irgln:ll cost because Ihey are forced Io spend on p,t~lff~tion abalemelll Io
eOil~Orlll wilh the quotll reslriclion. ~olne llrlns may Ollly reach thls quola ~11 vast exp~nse while odlers may
be able to :lrrive Lit it very cheaply. This incr¢ilses Ihe overall cost it) sociely of reaching the eflqeienl ouIpul.
IztlrthellllOle, wilh Ii qtlol~l regiriction, fimls need only rc:lCh the qllol[i applied to thenl: they need not end.age
in furlher ,~b:llemenl ex[z, endilures that could i;.:Jssibly benefit the ec(]nomy.
Taxes on the olher htlnd .’Ire less costly and provide :1 more correcl itlcentive lit indlviduld level. They life less
co~lly for Ihe economy ~1~; ~1 whole h~.~c;luse only thot;e I’[nllS which call reduce r~ll[ut]oll cheaply rio so. Firms
9,’hlch e~ln unly do So ~11 vilsI eosl pay the t~lx in~;tc~ld. Tilxcs apply at ~lll levels Of Uu(pul :llld thel~21Ol~ are [1
continuing incentive Io correct bchaviour.
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a combination of both. The EC’s present carbon tax proposal is for a combined
energy/carbon tax, for a nun~ber of reasons. First, the Commission wishes to
encourage efficiency in the use of the existing fuel nlix, as well as switching
within that mix to low-carbon fuels and the inclusion of an energy component in
the combined tax does this. If the tax is on energy input, there is an incentive for
users to consume less energy, whatever fuel is used. Second, the inclusion of an
energy component ensures that nuclear power is not given an unintended
advantage in the post-tax fuel cost relativities (nuclear power emits no CO.,).
The tax its applied to electricity generation illity take wlrious forms: it could
be levied at the fuel input or at the electricity output stage of Ihe generation
process. Given the mix of fuel involved in electricity generation, it seems easier
to calculate the tax on the carbon content of a fuel as it is input to the process,
rather than on the energy output, since the CO2 emissions resulting from the
production of any output is dependent on the carbon content of fnel input to the
combustion process. The energy component could be applied at the raw fuel
input or the electricity output stage, both of which can be expressed in a common
energy measure. The input tax - carbon or energy - ensures that more correct
incentives face the electricity generators. In this way, they tire forced to switch to
low carbon fuels and be more efficient in the use of fuels, regardless of carbon
content. In the case of taxing the input - whether energy or carbon input - it
would be difficuh to link each individual consumer with the fuel type used to
produce the electricity and therefore to calculate the carbon tax properly, hi fact,
the consumer would be required to pay a carbon tax which referred to the total
carbon tax payable by the ESB averaged over the fuel mix and calculated over a
previous period.
The output tax facilitates transparency in so far as electricity consumers are
concerned because it is easier to calculate: it is levied on electricily output
regardless of the type of fuel used to produce it. Transparency in turn makes it
easier to introduce lax rebates for high energy users and for finns exporting
outside the tax regime. A further characteristic of the output tax is that it does not
discriminate between efficient and inefficient fuels, so that the electricity
generator is not encouraged to switch fuels. Therefore, it is n’tore likely to
preserve the existing fnel mix.
The final design of Ihe tax in relation to these and other matters will
determine the effect on relative prices between energy and other goods and
between the differeut types of energy, and hence on the types of incentives
provided. The outcome in temps of incentives will, in turn, influence the amount
and type of adjustment by energy consumers, including electricity generators.
In accordance with the theoretical preference that externality taxes should be
used to replace other distortionaU,, taxes, the Commission has suggested that the
tax should have it neutral effect on the overall national tax burden. This means
IhzU carbon tax revenues could be used by naember stales 1o replace other taxes
¯ currently paid into tile Exchequer, such its those on labour (Fitz Gerald and
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McCoy, 1992). The tax neutrality condition is still the subject of negotiation
between u3ember states.
El’l~ct of Tax on Fuel Cost Differential
As discussed above Ibere are potentially many versions of the carbon tax.
Electricity geueration could be taxed on the energy or carbon fuel inputs used to
produce electricity or some combinalion of both. Alternatively, all the tax could
be imposed on electricity output. Anolber version of lax would be to combiue the
output element with a carbon input lax.
When all of the above possible versions of the carbon lax are applied, the unit
fuel cost differential between peat and oil widens in all cases except one, because
of the bigher carbon content of peat and the relative efficiencies of both when
used in electricity generation. The widening of tile differential ranges fl’ona 1.7p
to 2.83p, depending on tbe type of carbon tax used in tbe calculation. The largest
increase in the differenlial occurs in the case of a lax levied tolally on the carbon
content of the fuel input because peat emits 40 per cent more carbon dioxide than
oil per equivalent unit of energy input. However, Ibe differential also widens with
any combination involving a carbon component or au energy input component.
because of the lower conversion efficiency of peat relative to oil. The unit fuel
cost differential remains the same only if the tax is wholly based on energy
oulput.
The size of the fuel cost differential affects the outcome of the excess cost
computation, and therefore Ihe widening of the differential woukl point towards a
greater excess cost. assut’niug tbe quantity o1" peat consumed in electricity
generillion remains conslinll.
Given that peat consumption by Ibe ESB will be static up to 1996, the resuh
of the imposition of the carbon lax is tbat the tax-inclusive (or gross) cost of peat
electricity generation would increase by the amount of taxation involved. It is not
known whether, on imposition of tbe cltrbou tax. the arrangements between Bord
na M6na and the ESB covering peat deliveries up to 1996 could or woukl be
alterecl. For tile present, it seems reasonable to assume that tile quantity of milled
peal used in electricity generation will not decrease before 1996. If so, tile ESB
will nol be able to react to tile carbon tax its it would in tile absence of an
agreement and switch from peat to lower carbon fuels.
At this point, it is necessary to clarify from what perspective the analysis is
being carried out. From the ESB’s viewpoint, it would have to bear an additional
cost because of the greater lax-inclusive price of the peal which it is contracted to
purchase from Bord na M6na in any case (except where the tax is levied 100 per
cent on energy output). However, Ibe t:lx portion of its total expenditure ou peal
must be banded over to the Exchequer in much the same way its any other tax.
Depending on the format of the lax, the increased cost to the ESB for all fuels
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would range from £43m to £151m5; given that it spent £227m on fuel in 1990.
The percentage increase in electricity prices on the 1990 base required to covet"
this additional cost would vary from 6 per cent to 20 per cent.
Increase in Excess Cost to Nation?
The position is different from the standpoint of taxpayers and electricity
consumers in general: the after-tax excess cost remains the same as the original
excess cost. This is because the cost of the tax to electricity consumers - who are
beneficiaries of Government expenditure in the areas of health, education, etc. - is
cancelled out by a contribution of tax revenue fi’om the peal electricity generation
sector. This contribution is available to increase expenditure or to reduce
taxation, whether within the energy sector or outside it.
11 has been stated that the Commission intends that the introduction of a
carbon tax should not increase the overall burden of taxation at a national level,
so that the revenue from the tax would probably be used to reduce taxation
elsewhere, if, for example, the reduction in taxation elsewhere in the economy
increased allocative efficiency, the tax revenue portion of the new Iolal excess
cost could be offset at least partially or even totally by the increased efficiency of
the tax system. From society’s point of view, the carbon tax does not affect the
net after tax cost of continuation wilh peat generation.
From the point of view of the commercial Stale energy comp;mies and the
energy sector, the tax raised may be an extra cost if it is lost to the sector. If the
revenue was returned to the energy sector in the form of a subsidy or used to
relieve social insurance contributions the incentive to hire labour in these
companies would be increased, post carbon lax, and the same excess cost could
generate more jobs. However, a return of revenue in the l’ont~ of a subsidy lbr
social benefits say, would effectively defeat the fundamental purpose of the tax:
to adjust the cost of energy consumption to reflect its impact on global wurming.
Carbon Tax. Excess Cost and Conflicts in Energy Policy
The carbon tax has been proposed as an environmental measure by the EC.
Excluding peat from the effects of the measure may accord with the national
objective of protecting Irela~’td’s indigenous peal industry. However. it makes it
more difficult for the tax to achieve lrel:.nld’s emission target under the
Communily’s CO2 strategy. Even if the revenue were not returned to the energy
sector, the same problem would arise if, after imposition of the lax, peat
consumption continues at the same level. The ESB. in its discussion of strategies
for meeting the CO., targets, state that snbstitutit’tg gas for peat in electricity
generation is the most effective fuel switching programme available, but also that
the use of this strategy is constrained [’or security and social considerations (ESB,
This at;sunles thal Ihe tax is levied al [lie full rate propt>sed fnr Ihe end of Ihe decade. Ihal is, the equivldenl or
$1o per barrel of oil.
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1992). This trade-off between environfnental damage and regional and security
beuefits adds a further complication to tile petit debate, for policy-makers.
Impact on ESB Fuel Cost Differeeltial - Short vs. Long Term
As fur the ESB is concerned, peat-generated electricity would cost even more
compared to Ihtll produced from other fuels, if the tax wlis imposed. The size of
all the unit cost differentials would change - not just between peat and the other
fuels but also between the alternatives, gas, oil and coal. This would radically
affect existing incentives for fuel switching bclween till fuels used in eleclricity
generation imd as the ESB reacts to the new incentives, the quantities of the
various fuels used in electricity generation would change. However. despite the
incentive to switch away fronl peiil, Bord na Mona’s peat energy business in the
shorl to medium term, up to 1996, will not be affected because Ihe quantity of
peal to be delivered to the slalions is already determined.
However, the picture charlges when the long term is considered; over this
lime scale the ESB would have more freedom to switch belween the fuels from
which electricity is generated in reaction IO the newer post tax relative price
differentials. The increase in demand for electricity coupled with Ihe need to
retire some pe:.ll capacity over the next five to len years implies Ihiil addilional
capacily will have IO be commissioned in Ihe medium term.
The carbon tax adds an exlr,:l dimension to the cost analysis of future peal
generalion options because the size of the resuhing increase in the running costs
of any new station depends oll the fuel type it will use. The justification for
replacing the peat electricity geueralior~ stations in the post-tax era would be
weakened from the ESB’s point of view because peal electricity generation would
cost even nlore relative to olher fuels than it does now. However, it is ilnporttlu[
to conduct tile economic analysis of new capacity in Ihe context of the entire
economy and the cost burden, if any, imposed on lhe econon’ly by the additiorlal
investment in peat generation plant, rather than limiting the exercise to the ESB’s
costs alone.
If the thernlal efficiencies of petit generation could be improved in a new
station to such a degree as to maintain or even narrow the pre-tax fuel cost
differential, the outcome might be different. Since present peal efficiencies are 26
per cent oil average, it would be interesting to know how feasible significant
increases in efficiency tire and also to determine the effecl of the carbon lax oll a
peat slation capuble of achieving a ihem~al efficiency over 30 per cent. Similarly,
if other fuels increased significantly in price - as oil did in the 1970s - the rehitive
fuel differential would also change.
In conclusion, the short terrn annual cost burden imposed by peat electricity
generation on the economy, estimaled ill £30m. does not change when the c:.lrbon
tax is considered. However, Ihe tax does siguific~ultly affecl the fuel cost
relativilies as far us the ESB is concerned. It is in the nledium Io long term, when
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peat contracts fall due for renewal and peal generation plant due for retirement
must be replaced, that the adverse impact of the carbon lax on the unit cost
differentials between peat and its ahernalives may influence decision-making, by
the ESB and any other generators or distributors which have entered the Irish
market by then.
4. Conclusion
It has been shown thai peat electricity generation imposes a short-tem~ annual
cost burden on the economy, estimated at around £30m in this Chapter. This
excess cost is paid by electricity consumers, who face increased prices. This
situation does not change when the carbon tax is considered because the tax
revenue portion of the new total excess cost is available to provide offsetting
benefits to the nation.
Because of the existence of sunk costs buried in tile fuel cost differential, the
calculation of the cost to the nation is a more complicated question than just the
calculation of the difference in cost between peat and its nearest rival. This paper
shows thal the excess cost burden is around £30m rather than nearly £60m,
because of sunk and non-cash-flow costs of Bord na M6na. The calculation is
likely to be more complicated once a longer time scale is considered; in this
situation, the construction of new capacity and associated costs has to be included
in the computation.
Over the long term, the future of peat electricity generation is uncertain.
Future trends in EC free trade directives as the5, relate to electricity generation
may restrict Ireland’s discretion to protect the position of the peat industry and
maintain it into the future. The EC’s emphasis on the environment will also affect
peat because of the likelihood of measures being drown up to reduce other
pollutants produced by the generation process, apart from carbon dioxide
emissions. Because of the age of the existing plant, decisions will have to be
made over the next five years whether to replace plant due for retirement. The
ESB calculations are not likely to favour peat, unless the price of the peat is
reduced, tile price of the alternatives rises and/or significant improvements in the
efficiency of peat generation are realisable. Any analysis of the economics of new
peat capacity must be conducted having regard to the full energy policy context,
at both Irish and EC level, and refer to the economic and Exchequer costs of any
decision, as well the impact on the ESB.
The conclusion that the carbon tax nmkes no difference to the purely
economic cost of peat electricity generation means thai the problem remains:
whether the original excess cosl of peat electricity generation, discussed in the
first section, delivers benefits that society judges to be worthwhile. The use of
peat for electricity generation increases the cost of energy but this may be
necessary to "mhie e the other goals of energy policy. Such Irade-offs are implicit
in the nature of energy policy, which has multiple and conflicting goals. In the
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case of peat electricity generation, the cost burden may be seen as
counterbalanced by:
¯ the enhanced security of supply
and
¯ the regional policy benefits.
The use of peat provides security of supply in an number of ways. First, there
is a greater degree of control over a domestic energy source, such as peat, than
over an imported fuel, such as oil. Second, peat provides an elernent of
diversification in the fuel used for generation: it generated 16 per cent of
electricity in 1990 in third place, behind coal (42 per cent) and gas (27 per cent).
It also augments the security of the generation system because there are a number
of small peat stations rather than a single large one.
The peat electricity generation programme provides regional policy benefits
in Midland areas. The benefits comprise the direct enlployment in both Bord na
M6na and the ESB (2,167 full-time equivalents in 1990), the purchases of goods
and services by both companies, and the secondary jobs generated by the
expenditure of incomes from direct enaployment and purchases. The Midlands
have fewer manufacturing jobs, a lower level of manufacturing job creation and a
higher level of emigration than other regions in the country/’ If peat electricity
generation was abandoned, it is unlikely that these jobs could be replaced in the
short term, given the poor employmenl conditions in Midhmd counties.
The existence of policy benefits is not enough to justify the continuation of
peat electricity generation in economic terms. The question must be asked at
some stage whether the same benefits (security of supply and regional
employment) could be achieved at lower cost by abolishing peat electricity
generation and funding an alternative scheme which generated the same number
of jobs. Similarly, the possibility that greater benefits - whether in the Midlands
or elsewhere - could be obtained for the same level of expenditure in an
alternative application (in this case in the electricity consumers’ pockets) must
also be considered. The necessity to justify peat electricity in value-for-money
terms applies just as much to new investment as to continuation without
constrtlcting additional capacity.
In summary, the peat generation programme demonstrates the tension
between the various objectives of energy policy. It illustrates the conflict between
the objective of minimising cost, on the one hand, and the regional and security
objectives, on the other. Peat electricity is not the lowest possible cost generation
option; in fact, it imposes an excess cost burden of £30m on the economy as well
as an unquantified adverse impact on the environmental. However, the
programme delivers an element of security of supply and also regional benefits.
The sources for Ihe information on Midl~inds p~pulation and employlrlent were the Induslrial Developmenl
Aulhority (1990) and Ihe Central Slalislics Office (1992).
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The short-tern] excess cost burden of continuing peat electricity generation
C~.IU be quantified. It is the fundamental problem and remains so under the carbon
tax. The size of the excess cost burden would be different over the long term
when new capacity is considered, but in both cases, the effect of sunk costs must
be taken into account. The acceptability of the cost of peat generation (however
estimated) to society as a whole must be ascertained. The case for peat electricity
generation depends on the rehltive priorily attaching to the security,
environmental, least cost und regional objectives of energy policy.
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Appendix 5A." The Calculation of the Cost of Peat Electricity Get~eration."
Individual Stations
The calculation of the cost of peal electricity generation in the main text is
based on the average milled peat and Tarbert fuel costs. However. the outcome
does not differ if the calculation is based instead on the individual milled peal
stations’ trait fuel cost. The caleulatioils :are shown in Tables 5A and 5B below
are done in a slightly different way to that described in the main text. Here, the
depreciation and the debt inlerest costs werc deducled fronl Bord na M6na’s
revenue from the ESB and that amended revenue divided by the quantity of peal
delivered Io the stations in 1990 to arrive at a revised (or iuleresl and depreciation
exclusive) peal price. This assumes that the same price is paid at each station for
a tonne of milled peal. regardless of quality. Since price depends on quality and
other factors, this is 11o1 a correct ~.lssunlption. Information Oi1 exact peat [Olln~.lges
delivered to and prices paid at each stalion is not awfilable from the companies,
clue to its cornrnercial sensitivity. Peal tonnages consumed at each station were
derived by working back fi’om electricity outptlt to energy input, using the peat
thermal eMciency of 26 per cent. The tonnages were multiplied by the revised
milled peal price to arrive at revised fuel costs. Finally, these fuel costs were
divided by Ihe 1990 electricity output to arrive at revised peat unit costs (Table
5A). The differential between peat unit fuel costs at each sl;.llion and at Tarbert
was multiplied by the particular peat slation’s output to give a fuel cost saving,
and the olgeraliorlal and maintenance cost savings added 011 at the end as before
(Table 5 B).
Table 5A: Revised Fuel Cost per trait for Peat. 1990
Statimt Otttput Peat 7)mnage Revised Peat Price Revised Fuel Cost Re~’ised Unit Cost
(Million units) (’O00 tonne.~)      (£ltonne)         (£ Million)      (pence per ttnit)
Fcrbane 301 536 12.79 6.9 2.28
Rhode 299 462 12.79 5.9 1.98
Bcllacorick 222 364 12.79 4.7 2. I
Shannonbridge 566 836 12.79 10.7 1.89
Lancsboro 536 740 12.79 9.5 1.77
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Table 5B: Cost of Closure of the Peat Generation Stations and Replacement of
tile 1990 Peat electricity Output by Output from Tarbert
Ot~tl)Ut Revised Unit Fuel Unh Cost Differential Fuel Sa~qng from Switch:
Cost at Peat Station between Tarbert and Differ~,ntial Otttptlt
Peat Station (£ million)
(million Units) (pence per unit1 (pence per unit)
Western 22 3.91 2.17 0.48
Allenwoo~l 54 3.52 0.96 0.96
Ferbane 301 2.28 0.54 1.64
Rhode 299 1,98 0.24 0.73
Bellacorick 222 2. I 0.36 0.8 I
Shannonbridge 566 1.89 O. 15 0.87
Lanesboro 536 1.77 I).34 0.18
Summary of Iolal cosI savings:
Total Savings on Generation Costs:
Fuel Cost Saving        £ 5.67m
Operational Cosl Saving £11.72m
Maintenance Cost Saving £ 12.57m
£29.96m
Chapter 6
ENERGY ELASTICITY ESTIMATES AND TIlE STABILITY OF TI-IE
RELA770NSHIP WITH GDP
Denis Conuiffe
I. Why Elasticity Estimates Matter
Many issues and problems relevant to Irish energy policy are considered in
the preceding Chapters. In their analyses the authors have made use of estimates
of GDP and price elasticities. The GDP elasticity of a particular fuel is the
percentage increase in its consumption given a I per cent increase in GDP. The
own-price elasticity is the percentage decrease in consumption given a one per
cent rise in its price and is conventionally attributed a minus sign. Cross-price
elasticities with other fuels are the percentage increases in the fuel’s consumption
given I per cent increases in the prices of rival fuels. Obviously, GDP and
own-price elasticities can be defined for aggregate energy in a similar way.
It is easy to see that the elasticities are necessary components of the types of
analyses appearing in the other papers. In considering the impact of projected
economic growth on energy demand, the GDP elasticity is central to the
calculation. When discussing energy taxes, the magnitudes of own-price
elasticities determine the potential impact of possible policies. Elasticities are
even informative when considering competition and market structure; a fuel
monopolist may have little scope to exploit his market position if cross-price
elasticities are large. However, the importance of elasticities does not, in itself,
justify including a Chapter about their estimation. If the elasticity estimates could
be taken to be well established and stable+ discussion concerning their derivation
would be redundant here.
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But the estinlates are actually far fronl soundly established and there are even
disagreemenls in the lilerature oil how elasticities ought to be estimated.
Furthermore. the reasons for this unsatisfactory silualion go back to basic
uncertainties about how economic growth, energy requirements and technological
advance interact with each other, and perhaps also to fundamental limitations in
the del’initions and measurement of relevant quantities. So discussion of whal
elasticity values can plausibly be assigned is not only warranted, but may helI)
shed light on some of the interrelationships of energy with other factors.
Much of the discussion in future sections will centre on the GDP elasticity,
because, as will be seen, the stability of Ihe energy to GDP relationship is a
crucial issue. However, elasticities are estinlaled from historical data. where
energy demand, GDP and fuel prices were all changing simultaneously. So the
way in which the GDP relationship is specilied also affects the estimates of price
elasticities. The content of this Chapter draws heavily on the findings of several
unpublished reports, prepared for the ESRI’s Energy Policy Research Centre,
following the identilicalion of this problem of very uncertain elasticity estimates
as a priority theme for research.
2. Published Estimates c~’Elasticities and the Question of Stability
The international energy economics literature has paid a great deal of
attention to tile relationship between energy demand, energy price and GDP.
Many studies took aggregate energy demand as the measure of interest, rather
than working in terms of the component fuels and considering cross-substitution.
but some studies (lid disaggregate. Until the early 1980s. most authors assigned a
GDP elasticity of about unity to developed countries and a higher one to
developing countries. For example, Zilberfarb and Adams (1981) estimated an
average elasticity of 1.35 for the latter category. The price elasticity of aggregate
energy was usually estimated to be nluch smaller in magnitude for both
developed and developing countries.
The attlhors tended to implicitly assunle stable elasticity values by estimating
functional forms leading to constant elasticities. However. later authors found
large decreases over time in the GDP elasticity and associated them with changes
brought about by the oil price crises of 1974-75 and 1979-80. Ramain (1986)
surveyed OECD countries and reported far higher elasticities holding before 1974
than after it. For example, he gave pre-1974 values of I. 12 and .90 for Japan and
the USA and post-1974 values of .34 and .40 respectively. Some other authors
obtained similar restdls when they either split the time series into pre- and
post-1974, and estimated conventional constant elasticities within the sub-periods,
or fitted variable elasticity models over the whole period.
For Ireland, Conniffe and Scott (1990) found that applying a constant
elasticity model to the data from 1960 to 1987 gave a GDP elasticity estimate of
about I. I, but with a poor fit and evidence of instability. Splitting the sample and
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using dala from 1960-74 gave a GDP elasticity estimate of 1.3, while 1975-87
data yielded an estimate of .6. Fitting a rnodel, permilling a variable elasticity,
over the whole o1’ the data led to tile sarne results for the average elasticity during
Ihe periods and an even lower estimate of .5 for 1987. Disaggregating to
ir~dividual fuels, the authors found that this phenomenon of decreasing elasticity
occurred for the fuels, electricity, oil and LPG, but not for gas, coal and turf.
However, natural g:ts only came Oll slre:.ml in tile 1980s. so too much cannot be
concluded about the stability of its elaslicily, while neither coal nor turf showed
any significant positive relutionship at all with GDP growth over the whole data
period.
This apparent evolution, for aggregate energy and important component
fuels, fronl a slate of being cluite elastic with respect to GDP to being quite
inelastic, wouh:l have great inlplications for energy policy fornlulation if the
process could be assumed to have stabilised at the currenl elasticity values, or to
be continuing in the same direction. However, Ihe possibility that the elasticities
might increase again, or Ihat the decreases are somehow illusory, need to be
considered.
3. E.vplanations for Apparent Elasticity Changes
Whether tile decrease in GDP elasticity is accepted as real, or illusory, must
depend, to an extent at least, on ’,vhetl’~er plausible causative mechanisnls can be
visualised to exist. To begin with, it is not implausible that the GDP elasticity
may vary with tile secloral composition of an economy, since the energy inlensity
of economic growth muy differ by sector. The h’ish economy has evolved very
considerably from 1960 to 1987 with the agricultural sector becomir~g steadily
less important, relatively speaking, and first lhe mannfacluring sector, and then
tile services sector, becoming more important, lr~deecl, even the early sludies in
the energy econornics literature, as mentioned in the previous seclion, tended to
:assign lower elasticities to developed as compared to developing economies. But
it seems unlikely Ihat this explar~ation would be suMcienl, on ils own, Io account
for a drop in the Irish GDP elasticity from 1.3 to 0.5. Nor can it be easily applied
to explain why a developed economy, such as thai of the US, should show the
decrease revealed by Ranvain’s previously quoted figures.
Other authors have argued thal reduced elasticities are a consequence of
technological advance and, in a sense at least, are actually disguised price elTecls.
The chain of causation would be lhat the severe price hikes of 1973-74 and
1979-80 not only depressed demand at the time they occurred, but also triggered
major research and development in energy efficient technology. This lecllnology
remained in place after prices fell agairJ so (hat the increase in energy demand
consequent on price reductions did not match the previous decrease when prices
rose. Sillce the phenomenon is asynlnlelric wJth regpecl IO price, econonlelrJe
estimation does not catch it as a price effect and it appears instead as a seemingly
irreversible decline in the GDP elasticity. Explanations on these lines of indirec{
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or hidden price effects have been proposed by Wirl (1988) and Dargay (1990). In
practice it does not matter if a decrease in the GDP elasticity is really a
consequence of a past price rise triggering technical change, provided the new
lower elasticity can be relied upon.
However, although some technical advances could conceivably have
permanently lowered the GDP elasticity to some extent, the effects of other
technical advances could also have led to serious underestin’~ation of the GDP
elasticity in post-price hike periods if conventiomd estimation methods were
employed. To see this clearly, suppose that some years after a motivating price
hike some highly significant technical advances are made and that tllese phase in
over quite a long period, partly because of the time lag between motivation and
discovery, but also because of the gradual phasing out of old equipment and
introduction of new equipment embodying the advances. Suppose prices have
stabilised and GDP has continued to grow, though perhaps not at a very high rate.
If the technical advances have been great enough and phase in at an increasing
rate tnp to some year, it is conceivable that energy use could be unchanged or
even decreasing, so that an elasticity estimate based on Ihis period could be zero
or negative. However, once the lechnical advances had fully worked through,
new GDP growth would require increased energy use and an elasticity estimated
over a subsequent period would have become positive again.
The case just discussed is an exaggerated one, but shows how an
overestimate of a reduction in elasticity is possible if the estimation period is still
close enough to the price hike for the phasing-in effects to be still appreciable.
Given that the Irish data employed for estimation ran to 1987, and that the second
great energy price hike was 1979-80, the argument deserves consideration. It may
be worth mentioning that other arguments are also possible that attribute
apparent, but unstable, decreases in the GDP elasticity to hidden price effects. If
it is not current price, but the expectation of future price, that motivates decisions
to restrain energy consumption, it could be argued that decision makers did not
take the initial price falls after the 1979-80 price hike as permanent, but expected
the high prices to recur before long. The effect of this hidden variable of expected
future price would not be attributed by econometric analysis to price, but might
be manifested as an apparent decrease in the GDP elasticity. Of course, it would
not persist after price expectations adjusted. The argument is perhaps less
convincing than thai based on technical advances, since energy demand is derived
and high price expectations might reduce both GDP and energy, rather than affect
the relationship between them.
The possibility that technical advances may be biasing estimates of
elasticities, rather than truly lowering them, is connected to another problem: that
of obtaining meaningful measures of energy. Equal volumes of a fuel in 1960 and
1987 could have corresponded to very different quantities of utilised energy,
because the end use efficiency of appliances could have improved. It is possible
that the relationship between the utilisable energy of a fuel, if that were
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observable, and GDP could be quite stable, even if that between a volume
measure and GDP did not appear to be, during periods when technical advances
leading to improvements in end use efficiency were taking place.
In the literature, relationships with aggregate energy have received most
attention. However, aggregate energy is not as clear-cut a quantity as might be
imagined. There are really a number of fuels, which can substitute for each other
to varying degrees, and some procedure is required to produce an aggregate
quantity. By far the most frequently used procedure is to fornl a weighted sun] of
quantities, where the weights are measures of the energy contents of the fuels in
Joules, or British Thermal Units (BTUs), or ratios of the energy contents of other
fuels to that of a "standard" fuel. The latter melhod can lead to a measure of
aggregate energy as toanes of oil equivalent (TOE). Energy price can then be
calculated as total expenditure on fuels divided by this quantity measure. This
anlounls to a price per trait of energy content or unit ofoil equivalent.
Criticisms of this type of aggregation have sometimes been made in the
literature; for example, on the grounds thai the theoretical energy contents of coal
and electricity will not translate equally to availability for most users of the fuels.
Thus Chern (1978), working with US aggregate energy, argued that weights
should incorporate end use efficiency corrections. Factors such as versatility and
convenience are ilol taken into accounl by weighting on energy conleu[ and other
points could be made also. Tile point already made about individual fuels - that
the end use efficiencies may have been improving over time - further complicates
matters here if, as seems very plausible, the inlprovenlenls occurred at different
rates for different fuels.
The diffictdty with incorporating end use efliciencies into the weighting
process is that the relevant dala tire not available. The results of taking a snlall
step in Illal direction will be mentioned in a hner section. However, there are
other approaches to aggregation too. If tile derivation of an aggregate energy
price is seen as a problem in index number construction of the type analysed by
Allen (1975), or Diewert (1976), several methods are possible that ignore TOE or
BTU. Very simple methods, for example, a Laspeyres index using base year
weights, probably ignore too much information, but chained indices utilise the
evolving con]position by component fuels and n]ight be argued to relate to a
"price" of utilisable energy. Then dividing it into known aggregate expenditure
should give a quantity interpretable, to a degree, as a measure of tnilisable
energy. The measure of aggregate energy is now a weighted sun] of component
fuels where the weights are functions of current and past relative fuel prices. The
underlying idea is that if relative end use efficiencies vary over time, this should
be reflected, to some extent at least, in varying relative prices.
Obviously, Ibis cannot be a conclusive line of argument, since the equating of
a quantity index to utilisable energy should not be pushed too far. But if analysis
of such indices and their rel:ttionship to GDP led to different results that]
corresponding analyses of TOE measures, it would at least suggest that some of
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the diminishing GDP elasticity phenomena might lie in deficiencies in tile energy
measure. Interestingly, Nguyen (1987) claimed tbat couclusious about energy
demand :rod Ibe faclors inlqueucing it :.u’e sensitive to the ~.lggregation metbod
employed.
In the next three sections these possible explanations for tile apparent
decrease in GDP elasticity will be investigated further by analysiug available
Irish data. First though, some other explanations that have been suggested (and
disputed) in the international literature ~’~eed to be reviewed, if only to justify not
examining them further. What the expl:n’iations I’ulve in common is a belief that
relatively straightforward models and st:atistic:al estimates may be inappropriate in
energy demand studies and that some complicated models and some sophisticated
econometrics may reve:.d a different picture. However. the directions and details
of the complications differ greatly from author to author.
The typical methodology of the origin;.d estimates of energy elusticities w:as
to treat energy demand as a function of its price and GDP. usu:.dly assuming a log
linear t’ormul:.ttion and employing standard regression formulae. One theme of
complication stayed within a single e,..luution context and argued that extra
variables should be incorporated, allowing for lagged effects of GDP, price and
indeed of the dependent variable itself, to take care of adjustment effects, or other
dynamic mechanisms. Also, it was :argued that other possibly relevant variables
should be included as well as technical change, even if only as proxied by a time
trend. Examples in the literature include Bcenstock and Willcocks (1981),
Welsch (1989), Brennand and Walker (1990) :and Bentzcn arid Eugstead (1993).
Now undoubtedly the sit’nple model is an approximation at best and lagged
price effects arc certainly plausible. :although since prices are highly temporally
related it is not evident why including severul lagged price variables should give
a much different long-run price elasticity, or have more effect on a GDP elasticity
than just a single current price variable. The case for inclusion of other lagged
variables and a time trend is much more dubious and has been criticised by
authors including Kouris (1983) and Prosser (1985). It is true that models
incorporating a large number of par:.mleters cat’, give belter ills to data. in tbe
sense of satisfying slalislic:.d criteri:a, than more parsimonious models, but even
so, not every complicated model resulted in finding a stable GDP elasticity. The
inclusion of many highly related variables sometimes led to difficulty in st:atiug
:.tny clear-cut conclusions at all.
Other authors have complicated models in a different way by insisting that
energy ought to be treated as just one of a set of commodities whose demands are
simultaneously determined. Not only should multi-equation models be
formulated, but systems estimation methods should be employed. Fiebig, Seale
and Tbeil (1987) and Seale, Walker and Kirn ( 1991 ) estimated consumer demand
systems, with energy us one conlponent, and claimed to find higher GDP
elasticities than much of the literature bas. However, the issue of time varying
elasticities was not explicitly addressed, r~or perhaps could it have been, given the
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data requirements for simultaneous eslimalion. Other authors have tried to take
the simultaneous context even further. Longva, Oystein and Stern (1988) saw
estimation in a general equilibritml framework as appropriate, where
simultaneous effects of energy price changes on GDP could be allowed for.
While sinmltaneous estimation is undoubtedly what should be done. if il could
be, it usually cannot be. because of data deficiencies. Nor does it follow that
simpler partial analyses have 11o evidential value.
4. Ahernative Aggregate Energy Quantity and Price Measures
One way of assessing how the overall energy price has changed between the
previous and current years would be to calculate the cost of the current year’s
consun~ption of fuels at bolh current and previous prices and look at the ratio.
This is called a I::’aasche price index and the idea could obviously be extended to
compare eurrenl price with thai two years ago and so on to form a price index
series. Each term uses the current, or most recent year’s fuel quanlilies and rnakes
no use of the fuel quantities in earlier years. However, a Paasche index could
show the price change fronl I-I to I by using the quantities for year t and another
Paasche index could show tile change fronl I-2 to I-I by using the quantities for
year I-I. The idea of chaining is that if overall price doubles between t-2 and t-I
and doubles again between l-I and l, the deduction that price has multiplied by
four between t-2 and t is arrived at by inulliplying Ihe two ratios. So a chained
Paasche price index woukl compare current price wilh that two years ago by
mullilglying tile two year-on-year indices. Exlending this idea leads to a chained
index series.
Other forms of price index are possible. For example, the fuel quantities for
year t-I could be costed at both year I and year t-I to give a Laspeyres index
measure of price change. A chained form of the Laspeyres index can also be
derived and Ihere are a variely of other possible indices also.
There are various arguments that can be made about the choice of a price
index, but two simple points seem sufficient here. First, a chained index makes
more use of Ihe data than an unchained one, which ignores the prices and
quantities in between the years being compared. Second, it has been fotn’~d thai in
practice unchained Paasche. Laspeyres and Fisher indices cau sometimes deviate
considerably from each other, but the chaiued fornls are much more uniform.
They also tend to be close to other methods of obtaining indices that make
intensive use of the data; for example, the discrete Divisia index.
Quantity indices can be defined analogously to price indices, but the easiest
way to consider quanlily indices is to remember that total current expenditure on
fuels will be available each year. Dividing this by the relevant price will give a
quantity measure. In the discussion that follows, mosl comparisons will be
between a chaiued Paaschc price index and the corresponding quantity measure,
on tile one hand, and tile conventional TOE nle:lSul’es on tile other. For
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convenience the index quantity measure will be described as a "Paasche"
measure, although, strictly speaking, the result of dividing expenditure by a
chained Paasche price index is a chained Laspeyres quantity index. Findings from
other indices will be discussed in the Appendix to show that any other set of
chained indices would have given similar results.
The data employed 1o construct the indices are the same as employed by
Conniffe Lind Scott (1990) in their study based on TOE measures and consist of
quantities and prices of the six fuels - piped gas, bottled gas (LPG), electricity,
coal, turf and oil - for the years 1960 to 1987 inclusive. Prices were deflated
using the GDP deflator and quantities excluded any amounts used to manuhLcture
other fuels. Some more recent data have become available, but these will be
employed in the final section of the paper for purposes of verification rather than
estinaation.
Indices versus TOE Measures
The index and TOE quantity measures are compared graphically in Figure
6.1 where they have been scaled to have the same value (100) in 1960. The
chained Paasche quantity rose above the TOE measure and diverged increasingly
from it. The index quantity measure would show a much higher energy
consumption in 1987 than the TOE measure would and indeed would suggest
that the rate of increase in energy consumption has not fallen off as much
(compared to the pre-1974 rate) as the TOE measure would seem to indicate. The
pattern is perhaps conlpatible with an interpretation of the index quantity as
closer to utilisable energy than is the TOE aggregate.
Figure 6.1
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The chained Paasche price index and the price per unit of TOE (again scaled
to be equal in 1960) are shown in Figure 6.2. Here the situation is ~.dnlosI the
reverse of thai for quantities; the price index is below the TOE price for the
whole period after the initial two years. Of course, this could have been logically
deduced from the fact that the product of the price index and quantity index is
real expenditure. Note that the differences between the two series are greatest in
the years inlmediately after the price hikes of 74-75 and 79-80.
If the identification of the index qtmntity with accessible or utilisable energy
could be taken as valid, Figure 6.2 would indicate that the price of utilisable
energy has not risen over the period to the extent the TOE price would indicate.
In fact the index energy price was slightly lower in 1987 than in 1960. Note that
prices, being deflated, are expressed in real terms. The implication would be that
improvements to end use efficiencies of fuels at least compensated for the price
rises. While the TOE price is undoubtedly a valid measure of the cost of a unit of
TOE, it seems to overestimate true energy cost in that it makes no allowance for
improved end use efficiency.
Figure 6.2
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Using exactly the same econometric analysis as Conniffe and Scott (1990)
employed for the TOE measures gave a considerably higher price elasticity for
the indices; the value being about -0.6, or 50 per cent higher than that for the
TOE measures. However, there was still evidence that a constant GDP elasticity
model did not adequately fit the data and that a decreasing elasticity formulation
provided a better fit. But the rate of decrease was not as large as with the TOE
estimates. Details of the econometric tests and diagnostics employed have been
given in Conniffe (1991) along with accounts of modifications to the basic nlodel
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incorporating lagged price efflzcts. Lag patterns are more clearly identifiable with
tile index measures than was the case with TOE, although the long-run price
elasticity was relatively unaffected by tile lag structure, as is to be expected given
the aulocorrelalion of prices.
Tile persistence of tile indications of a diminishing GDP elasticity may be
partly because other explanations may be involved, beskles that of tile
identification of some measure with ulilisable energy; for example, sectoral
evolution of tile economy. But it could also be because the Paasche measure is
not an adequate approximation to utilisable energy. [I would be wrong to claim
that relative prices are precisely proportional to relative efficiencies. Price is
affected by properties of fuels, such as convenience and cleanliness, besides
utilisation efficiencies. The quantity index is not truly a measure of ulilisable
energy, although it may be closer to il than is the TOE measure. Tile findings
from analyses of the indices cannot be taken as more than suggestive.
A Very Restricted Direct Adjustment for End-Use Efficiency
Measures of end-use efficiencies of fuels for till of the years 1960 to 1987 are
not currently available. But Scott (1992) has given estinlates of end use
efficiencies tot lhe year 1987, which tire shown in Table 6.1. Since end use
efficiencies of at least some fuels have certainly been changing over the period,
the results of weighting Ihe fuel TOE contents by their 1987 end use efficiencies
before summing to get the quantity nleasure will be far from an ideal measure of
utilisable energy, but at least it will differ from tile TOE one.
Having calculated this efficiency adjusted energy (EAE) nleasure, a
corresponding price can be obtained by dividing total expenditure on fuels by the
measure, lu Figure 6.3 this price is compared with the TOE and Paasche index
prices, again scaling to equality in 1960. The price of EAE stays between tile
odler two prices, but remuins closer to the TOE price.
In the case of the quantity nleasure, it is clear that since tile efficiencies in
Table 6. I were all less than unity, EAE in any year would have to be less than the
TOE quantity measure. However, when rescaled to equalily for 1960, which is
reasonable since for elasticity estimation it is changes over time thai nlatter, the
quantity measure was found to lie betweeu the index and TOE measures
previously shown in Figure 6. I. Again, the EAE measure remained closer to TOE
than to the index.
The price and GDP elasticities estimated using tile EAE measures are quite
similar to those obtained from the TOE measures. Tile price elasticity is slightly
higher (though not statistically significantly so) than the TOE estimate, but well
below tile index estimale. There is not as great an apparent reduction in tile GDP
elasticity as in the TOE case. but more than for the index. It could perhaps be
hypothesised thai the EAE measure takes up some of the discrepancy between
TOE and true utilisable energy, but not as much as the index does.
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Table 6.1: End-Use EJficienciesJbr Fuels, 1987
Fuel End-Use Efficiency (proportion)"
Gas 0.78
Electricity 0.72
Coal 0.44
Turf 0.34
Oil 0.45
LPG 0.67
These figures ,.,,’ere derived by first estimating end-use efficiencies by sector -
residential, industrial, transportation, commercial - for each fuel and Ihen weighting
by Ihe relative importance of the sectors.
5. Adding Measures of Structttral Change
As already mentioned, the Irish econon’,y has evolved very considerably over
the periocl 1960-1987 and it is possible that its sectors of Ihe economy changed in
importance the aggregate GDP elastieily could change also. The implication here
is that Ihe elaslicities of energy demand with respect to secloral output might
differ by sector. Then, even if elasticities were constant over time within sectors,
the aggregate elasticily could still change will’, lime.
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Clearly the direct and best way of investigating this, if fully satisfactory data
existed [’or all sectors, would be to estimate output elasticities for different sectors
and compare them. Unfortunately, fully comprehensive data are only being
assembled, so this is not yet a feasible approach for all sectors. The alternative,
which will be pursued, is to add measures of the evolutionary state of the
economy into the aggregate model and see if the GDP elasticity is affected by
them. Since a regression coefficient can be interpreted as measuring the response
to an explanatory variable given that other variables in the model are held
constant, it should, in principle at least, be possible to deduce what the GDP
elasticity would have been if the economy had not evolved structurally, although
some imprecision will inevitably result from multicollinearity between the
structural variables and GDP.
The two variables taken as measuring changing economic structures are the
proportion of GDP accounted for by Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing and the
proportion accounted for by Industry. The first measure, to be denoted by AG,
declined over the period from about 25 per cent in 1960 to I I per cent in 1987.
Apart from slight fluctuations in the 1970s the decline was continuous. The
second variable, to be denoted IND, increased from 30 per cent in 1960 to 36 per
cent by 1968 and then fluctuated a little (touching 38 per cent in 1985)
subsequeutly. The Services sector filled the percentage gap created by the
continuing decline of AG from 1968 on. The evolution of the variables is shown
in Figure 6.4.
Figure 6.4
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Conlmencing with the TOE quantity and price measures, adding AG to tbe
model had negligible effects on elasticities, nor was the variable itself statistically
significant. The IND variable was closer to statistical significance, but did not
achieve it. It may be worth mentioning that although the effects on the GDP
elasticity estimate were infinitesimal, there was a substantial reduction in the t
values. This is because AG and IND are highly correlated with real GDP, the
correlations being -.94 and .83 respectively. More detailed infomlation about
these analyses, including accounts of Ibe econometric formulations and tests, are
given in Conniffe (1992).
Repeating tbe process for Ibe EAE variables gave very similar results to those
obtained for the TOE measures. Continuing to the Paasche index measures tbe
sectoral change variables came closer to achieving statistical significance and
actually do so in some of the variants with lagged price structures. The best
model - in the sense of showing tbe largest effects for AG and IND - is one with
the price effect represented as a five period, second order, distributed lag. The
elasticity estimates and sectoral change coefficients are shown in Table 6.2.
Table 6.2: Adding StrHcttlral Change Variables to the Model
Model Price GDP AG Coef
ElasticityI Elasticity IND Coef
P, G DP -0.64 1.20 (28. I):
P, GDP, AG       -0.78 .99 (I 1.6) -.26 (-2.8)
P, GDP, IND -0.62 1.06 (18.5) .98 (3.2)
P, GDP, AG, IND    -0.71 .97 (12.3)
-.16(-I.6) .73(2.2)
Long-Run Elasticities 2 t values in brackets
The IND variable is bighly statistically significant and the pair of variables
are certainly jointly significant when entered together. The IND variable is the
most statistically significant, probably partly because of the lower magnitude of
its correlation with GDP. The proportion of Industry in GDP rose in the early
years of the period and it is plausible that energy demand was affected by this.
Without secloral change variables in the model, this effect would be attributed
totally to GDP growth. It could be argued that perhaps it should be, since the
sectoral change and GDP growth were far from independent factors. However,
what is important for predicting future energy demand is the GDP elasticity that
holds currently and the output of the industrial sector has been a relatively
constant proportion of GDP since the end of the 1960s. So it could make sense to
delete out the contribution of sectoral change, or at least that attributable to
industry share. Another way of looking at this is to say that if effects of sectoral
change were included as GDP growth effects, there would have been a bigher
GDP elasticity in the earlier part of the period. However. the difference is about
.2 at most.
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An obvious question now arising is if there is any longer any evidence of a
declining GDP elasticily given a model Ih:.lt has allowed for sectoral evolution
and perhaps even the improved end-use eMciency of fuels, in so far :.is the latter
can be assumed partially catered for by working with a Paasche price and
corresponding quantity index. A statistical test for decreasing elasticity (based on
generating a new variable consisting of the product of the log of GDP multiplied
by a time trend, adding it to the model and applying a test to its estimated
coefficient) led to a I value of-1.84. This falls short of statistical significance, but
it is still suspiciously close to significance. Also. the model with the sectoral
change variables, lagged price variables :.rod the new variable conslructed from
the product of a lime trend and GDP, now cordains substantial mullicollinearity,
which depresses t values. It seems sounder to proceed by accepting the decrease
and estirnaling its m:Lgnilude for tile whole 1960 to 1981 period. This turns out to
be .16. plus or minus an error estimate. But even taking it as .2 and allowing
another .2 for sectoral evolution, the overall reduction is not nearly as large as the
initial TOE analysis would have suggested. A 1987 elasticity of about .9 rather
than .5 wouh:l seem indicated.
]-[owever, it sllould be repeated Illal a lot depends on the identification of the
Paasche index variables as meaningful measures of quantity and price. Nol only
do the index measures lead to a more stable relationship, but the measures of
seetoral composition had far less explanatory power with the TOE measures. It
could be argued thai since energy ’,,,,,ill actually be purchased as quantities of
fuels, which can be thought of in TOE terms, it is really TOE elasticities that are
important for policy decisions. This is :.t valid argument and the justification for
the relevance of elasticities based on tile index must be thai they would become
applicable to TOE quantities if conditions stabilised. To repeat argurnents: the
idea is that utilisable energy increases in line with GDP in a relalively stable
fashion; utilisable energy is a fixed proportion of TOE, given a constant
technology, but not when end use efficiencies :are actually cllanging; so when
changes have worked through, the elasticities will coincide again.
6. Modelling TOE Energy with Irreversible Price Effects
From the concluding remarks of the last section it is clear thai an analysis of
TOE energy in lerms of GDP, price and end use efficiency would be desirable.
The problem is that tile measures of e0d use efficiency are not aw.filable. The
approach of previous sections was to replace TOE by an index. But instead,
perhaps some proxy for tile missing variable could be found. Utilisable energy is
the product of TOE and the missing variable. So. working with the conventional
log model, and assuming thai utilisable energy has a stable relationship with
price and GDP gives
Log qt = Xt + b log p, + d log Yt
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where q, p and y denote TOE. its price and GDP respectively and x, is a variable
representing the deviation between TOE and ulilisable energy which varies with
teclmical change. Lagged price effects could be included, although, :.is before, the
high correlalions of Pt and PH suggesl I11:.11 neither the estimate of the long run
price elaslicity nor that of the GDP elasticity will be sensitive to the precise lag
structure. This model differs from the slandard regression one in Ihal x is not a
fixed intercelsI, but variable. Since x is not observable, il rllUSt itself be modelled.
Price hikes are presumed to trigger research, tollowed after a lag by technical
advance, which i-enlains in place whell prices fall. This suggests relating x to the
cumulalive total of (log) price increases, where price decreases arc omitted from
the total. This cunlulalive price increase variable is
/
Ct=Z, ~(Iogpi)hi
i=1
where hi is unity if A is positive and zero otherwise al%d its development over
time is shown in Figure 6.5.
In formulating a modcl, xt could be taken as al)proxinlalely u linear function
of C,.,,, where m represents Ihe lag betweell research and discovery. Tilts suggests
II1:.11 :.1 model
Iogqt =a+bl°gl3,+g log C,.m+dlogy,
might be al3propriale for TOE energy dal:.l. Of course, lagged values of C ,.,,, could
also be included, although the same remarks as made about lagged price variables
¯ ,vould apply. In tiffs model Ihe b coefficient measures the usual, reversible, price
elasticity, while the g coefficieut measures the price induced, but irreversible,
lechnical change el’t~cl. This approach to I’landling Ihe direct and indirect efl~cls
of energy price is derived from the "ratchet models" of Wolf from (1971) for
asymmetric price responses, which have been applied by Youug (1983) to
modelling addictive behaviour and. indeed, by Young, Stevens and Wills (1983)
to a study of rcsideutial electricity denland.
As so far formulated, the model would correspond Io a stable GDP elasticity.
Some technical advances nlay 11Ol lake efl’ecl though improving the end-use
efficiencies of fuels, bul could conceivably permanently reduce the GDP
elasticity. The C variable can also be used to specify models with a varying GDP
elasticity, by adding a term of the form
k (C,.~ log y, )
into the model. The term ".,vould modify the elasticily d by k C,~ and wouh:l
reduce it if k is negative and if C,., increases clue to a price rise. Flere r again
represents a lag bel,.veen price rise and subsequent ell’eel on the eluslicity. If there
are different types of technical advances, there seems no reason why r shottld
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equal m. By estimating the coefficient k and testing its significance, the
hypothesis of a decreasing rather than a stable GDP elasticity can be examined.
In fitting the model with the reversible and irreversible price effects, a value
of m = 2 was found appropriate and the estimates of b, g and d were -.2, -.3 and
1.2 respectively, with corresponding t values of -3.0, -4.4 and 22.0. More detailed
descriptions of the econometric issues involved and the estimation methods
chosen are provided in Conniffe (1993). The price elasticity of-.2 is smaller than
other analysis methods yielded, but these did not allow for the irreversible price
effect, which is larger in magnitude. Diagnostic tests, based on examination of
residuals, did not seriously undermine the plausibility of the model. Introducing
the product term already mentioned, a formal test for a diminishing GDP
elasticity led to a value for k of-.06 (with r = 3) and a t value of -I .3, which falls
well short of statistical significance.
Figure 6.5
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So it seems that using the idea of irreversible as well as reversible price
effects, a model can be estimated that satisfies the statistical criteria for
plausibility without requiring the addition of any mechanism to permit a
decreasing GDP elasticity. It would be going too far to claim that the model
fom~ulated in this section is the true one; there might be other ways of
incorporating irreversible price effects also. But the analysis reinforces the
findings of earlier sections that the apparent diminishing GDP elasticity may be,
to a large extent, a reflection of other unmeasured factors.
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7. Seeking ConfirmatoO, Data
The original Connil:fe and Scott (1990) estimates, as well as the similar
findings in the international literature, suggested that the GDP elasticity
applicable to Irish energy demand in 1987 had fallen to about .5. The
re-examination of this paper suggests the elasticity is much higher. Now further
dala ought to help confirm matters. A theme running through the previous section
has been thai technical advances motivated originally by the price hikes of
1973-74 and 1979-80 have been upsetting the proportionality between ulilisable
energy and TOE and distorting elasticity estimation. However. when technical
advances have worked through the proportionality should be restored and
estimates incorporating the new data should show the GDP elasticity increasing
again.
The data on which all the analyses presented were based terminated at 1987.
Scott (1993) has recently extended the data to 1991. The w~rious estimates could
be recalculated using all the data, or the estimates already obtained could be
compared with the actual outcomes over the period 1988-91. There is always
sonic virtue in keeping estimation data separate fronl validation data in trying to
arrive at objective assessments. The validation period is rather shorl and perhaps
not distant enough from the 1979-1980 price crisis to be sure that consequent
technical changes have fully worked through. However, the postulated effect
should be observable.
From 1988 to 1991 real GDP increased by 14 per cent while TOE energy
consumption increased by 10.2 per cent. However. this lower increase is at least
partly due to the increase in energy price per unit of TOE over the period,
measured in real terms, using the GDP deflator. The prices of two fuels,
electricity and peat, actually fell by about 5.5 per cent, but the prices of coal, oil.
LPG and gas rose by 8.5, 7.5, 10.8 and 12.7 per cent, respectively. The overall
TOE price, in which oil has the heaviest weighting by far. rose by 6.5 per cent.
Energy demand is price inelastic, but even so, estimates of around -0.4 would
imply that this price rise caused a downward adjustment of 2.6 per cent on energy
demand. Adding this to the observed increase of 10.2 per cent in TOE energy
consumption implies that, had price remained constant, the increase would have
been nearly 13 per cent. Comparing this with the 14.1 per cent increase in GDP,
and allowing for inevitable data variations, suggests it would be unwise to take
the current GDP elasticity as much below unity ;and cert:ainly not as low as .5.
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APPENDIX 6.A: The Various Price Indices
The simple Paasche price index for change from a base year to year I uses the
fuel quantities in year t as weights. So
- ~ I’.0_,(PA)0, Eeo, Q, i = 1, 2, ... 6
where the summation is over the six fuels. The Chained Paasche index for year
zero to year one is the same as the simple index. The chained index for year zero
to year two is the product of tile two simple indices for year zero to year one, and
for year one to year two. Unlike a simple index, which uses final year quantities
as weights in all year values, the chuined index uses the intermediate quantities
also. As formulae
(CPA)ot = (PA)ol, (CF’A)o2 = (CPA)oI (PA)t2, (CPA)o3 = (CPA)0z (PA)23 etc.
Laspeyres price and chained price indices can be defined similarly, the
diffcrence being that the link from period k to k+l uses the quantities for period
k. For example,
(L)01 EPo, Q0, i = 1,2, ... 6
The simple Fisher index is defined as the square root of the product of the
simple Paasche and Laspeyres indices, and a Chained Fisher index can be defined
by
(CF)o~ = (F)o~, (CF)o2 = (CF)ot F~:, (CF)o3= (CF)oz F23 etc.
The Divisia index originates with a treatment of time as a continuous variable
leading 1o an expression for an index in terms of integrals over time. The
approach was developed by Divisia (1925) and Roy (1927). Allen (1975, p. 181)
points out that any of the chained indices can be regarded as discrete
approximations to the underlying continuous index. Another discrete
approximation is that due to Tornqvist (1936), for which the price index for
periods I to 2, say, is
(D)I. = Expl½Z(Wi2 + Wil) Iog(PJPil)],
where Wi denotes the budget share
Pi Qi/~’Pi Qi.
Quantity indices could be defined in a similar way to price indices by
weighting quantities by base year prices (the simple Laspeyres measure), or by
current year prices (the simple Paasche measure) and the extensions to Fisher
type indices and chained indices follow in the same way as for price indices.
Quantity indices can also be obtained by just dividing expenditures by price
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indices and this has some virtues as will be returned to shortly. The various
measures of price and quantity are not all independent. For example, it is easily
verified that dividing expenditure by a Paasche price index actually gives a
Laspeyres quantity index.
As regards choice of best indices, guidelines can be drawn from both
statistical and theoretical economic considerations. Fisher (1922) set out a set of
desirable statistical properties that index numbers ought to display: such as
identity, proportionality and change of units invariance. Some properties are
satisfied by all the indices mentioned earlier and some are satisfied by only a
subset of them. For example, the factor-reversal properly is that the product of a
price index and a quantity index should give the corresponding ratio of
expenditures. Althougb satisfied by the Fisber-ldeal index (whicb, as the name
suggests, satisfies most of Fisher’s criteria), this is not satisfied by simple
Laspeyres or Paasche indices. However, there is no reason why a quantity index
should not be Laspeyres and a price index Paasche and the property is then
satisfied by just generating either the price or quantity index by formulae and
obtaining tbe other by dividing into current expenditure.
The "theoretical" economic arguments for or against particular index number
Ibrmulae may not be very relevant to the situation of determining an aggregate
energy quantity and price from individual fuels. They arise from considering the
index formula as an approximation to an unknown (but assumed constant over
time) "true" aggregator. The nature of the approximation may, in some
applications, be inconsistent with what economic theory may suggest for the
situation. For example, a simple Laspeyres quantity index could be written
P iO Qit
so that the weights Pio/Eo (Eo being expenditure in the base year) are constant
for all years and the index is thus a constant linear function of the component
quantities (fuels in this case). It is this linearity that is sometimes deemed
inconsistent with economic theory. If, for example, the Qi referred to inputs to a
sector of industry and the indices were to represent output quantity and price, the
linear formulation might be thought to imply a ratber restrictive concept of the
sector’s production function. The Fisher Ideal or Divisia formulae, which do not
reduce to linear forms, might be considered less constraining. This topic is
discussed by Diewert (1976) and, in the agricultural context, by Boyle (1986-87).
However, these remarks do not apply to chained indices in any event, because
then the weighting formula is evolving with the observations.
As was mentioned in tile main text, it has been found in practice that the
various chained indices and Divisia index behave very similarly; something that
need not be true of the simple indices. So the chained Paascbe price index was by
no means the only candidztte for use and it would be worrying if the findings
described were very dependent on tile precise formulation of the measures of
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quantity and price. In fact, they were relatively invariant over three other indices:
Chained Laspeyres, Chained Fisher and Divisia. This is illustrated in the table
where all four indices are conlpared with each other and with the TOE measures
in ternls of the coefficients of variation of quantity and price measures.
It is clear that the major difference in the Table 6A is between TOE measures
and the others. The index measures all show a greater coefficient of variation of
the aggregate quantity measure and a smaller coefficient of variation of the price
nleasurc. The differences between indices are very slight. Finally, the Figure 6A
shows the Chained Paasche and Laspeyres price indices as compared to the TOE
price. Again, the dominant differences are between the two chained indices and
the TOE measure.
Table 6A: Comparison of Indices in terms of Variation in Quantity and
Price
Measures of Quantity and Price CV of Quantity CV of Price
TOE 24 2 I
Chained Paasche 32 17
Chained Laspeyres 31 18
Chained Fisher 31 17
Divisia 31 17
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